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infrastructure industries? Building on world-society and neoinstitutional theories in sociology, this paper
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on the adoption of four reform elements: the privatization of state-owned firms, the formal separation of the
regulatory authority from the executive branch, the de facto elimination of executive political influence on the
regulatory authority, and the opening of the retail market to multiple service providers. It finds generally
robust support for its arguments using a multivariate probit analysis of reform adoption in the
telecommunications and electricity industries of as many as 71 countries and territories between 1977 and
1999. The results also suggest that the coercive effect of lending by the IMF and World Bank differs for each
reform element. The paper discusses the possibility that, by leading countries to adopt some reform elements
but not others, international coercion may not produce ideal outcomes.
Disciplines
Business Administration, Management, and Operations | International Business
This journal article is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/mgmt_papers/68
International Coercion, Emulation and Policy Diffusion: 
Market-Oriented Infrastructure Reforms, 1977-1999 
 
 
WITOLD J. HENISZ 
The Wharton School 
2021 Steinberg Hall-Dietrich Hall 
University of Pennsylvania 
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6370 
Tel: (215) 898-0788 
Fax: (215) 898-0401 
Email: henisz@wharton.upenn.edu 
 
BENNET A. ZELNER 
McDonough School of Business 
G-04 Old North 
Georgetown University 
Washington, DC 20057 
Tel: (202) 687-6087 
Fax: (202) 687-1366 
Email: zelnerb@georgetown.edu 
 
and 
 
MAURO F. GUILLÉN* 
The Wharton School 
2016 Steinberg Hall-Dietrich Hall 
University of Pennsylvania 
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6370 
Tel: (215) 573-6267 
Fax: (215) 898-0401 
Email: guillen@wharton.upenn.edu 
 
June 17, 2004 
 
 
* Corresponding author. This research was supported by the Reginald H. Jones Center for 
Management Policy, Strategy and Organization at the Wharton School through the General 
Electric Fund. 
 
 2
BIOGRAPHY PAGE 
 
 
Witold J. Henisz is an Assistant Professor of Management at the Wharton School. He received 
his Ph.D. from the Haas School of Business at University of California, Berkeley. His research 
examines the impact of political hazards on international investment strategy. He considers both 
the determinants of government attempts to redistribute investor returns to the broader polity as 
well as the determinants of the success of individual firms in withstanding such pressure. His 
research has been published in such scholarly journals as Academy of Management Journal, 
Academy of Management Review, Administrative Science Quarterly and Strategic Management 
Journal.  
 
 
Mauro F. Guillén is the Dr. Felix Zandman Endowed Professor of International Management at 
the Wharton School and Professor of Sociology in the Department of Sociology of the University 
of Pennsylvania.  He received a PhD in sociology from Yale University and a Doctorate in 
political economy from the University of Oviedo in his native Spain.  His current research deals 
with the diffusion of practices and innovations in the global economy.  His most recent book, 
The Limits of Convergence: Globalization and Organizational Change in Argentina, South 
Korea, and Spain, was published by Princeton University Press in 2001. 
 
 
Bennet A. Zelner is an Assistant Professor of Strategy and Policy at Georgetown University’s 
McDonough School of Business. He received his Ph.D. from the Haas School of Business at the 
University of California at Berkeley. His current research examines how firms manage the 
political, legal, regulatory and social risks and opportunities that they confront, especially in their 
overseas operations. His work has appeared in Academy of Management Review, Industrial and 
Corporate Change, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy and Strategic Organization. 
 3
 
International Coercion, Emulation and Policy Diffusion: 
Market-Oriented Infrastructure Reforms, 1977-1999 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Why do some countries adopt market-oriented reforms such as deregulation, privatization 
and liberalization of competition in their infrastructure industries while others do not? Why did 
the pace of adoption accelerate in the 1990s? Building on neo-institutional theory in sociology, 
we argue that the domestic adoption of market-oriented reforms is strongly influenced by 
international pressures of coercion and emulation. We find robust support for these arguments 
with an event-history analysis of the determinants of reform in the telecommunications and 
electricity sectors of as many as 205 countries and territories between 1977 and 1999. Our results 
also suggest that the coercive effect of multilateral lending from the IMF, the World Bank or 
Regional Development Banks is increasing over time, a finding that is consistent with anecdotal 
evidence that multilateral organizations have broadened the scope of the “conditionality” terms 
specifying market-oriented reforms imposed on borrowing countries. We discuss the possibility 
that, by pressuring countries into policy reform, cross-national coercion and emulation may not 
produce ideal outcomes.  
 
 
Word Count: 16,128 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The last two decades of economic globalization have been accompanied—and perhaps 
fueled—by a set of market-oriented policies such as trade and capital account liberalization, 
privatization of state-owned enterprises, and deregulation or liberalization of competition in a 
variety of industries. This trend has been particularly pronounced in critical infrastructure sectors 
such as telecommunications, electricity, water, highways and airports. The efficiency gains that 
market-oriented reforms offer are often assumed to be substantial in size. Nonetheless, countries 
vary significantly in the time at which they have adopted market-oriented reforms in these 
sectors, and some have not adopted any such reforms at all. While multiple factors explain the 
diffusion patterns of such reforms, perhaps the most controversial involve the impact of 
international coercion and emulation. Coercive pressures are the result of power dynamics, while 
emulation takes place among actors that recognize one another as being part of a certain social 
structure. The cross-national study of policymaking is therefore sociologically meaningful 
because of the processes of power and influence that underlie diffusion.  
While there exists a considerable body of empirical research on the cross-national 
diffusion of ideas, practices and policies,1 no published study considers international coercion 
                                                 
1 The policies whose adoption is analyzed include social security systems (Collier and 
Messick 1975), oil nationalizations (Kobrin 1985), decolonization (Strang 1990), the growth of 
the welfare state (Strang and Chang 1993), the bureaucratization of national science policy 
(Finnemore 1993), currency crises (Glick and Rose 1998), environmental protection (Frank, 
Hironaka, and Schofer 2000a; Frank, Hironaka, and Schofer 2000b), quality certification by 
firms (Guler, Guillén, and Macpherson 2002), deregulation (Eising 2002; Gilardi 2003), 
neoliberal macroeconomic policies (Yebra 2002a; Yebra 2002b; Yebra 2003), pension 
privatization (Weyland 2003), current account liberalization (Biglaiser and Brown 2003), capital 
account liberalization (Brune and Guisinger 2003), central bank independence (McNamara and 
Castro 2003), right to transparency laws (Roberts 2003) and privatization (Brune, Garrett, and 
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and emulation effects simultaneously.2 In this paper, we approach the diffusion of market-
oriented policy reform in the electricity and telecommunications industries from a unified 
framework drawing on neo-institutional theory. While our focus is on international explanations 
of policy reform, we necessarily take into account the domestic political-economic determinants 
of policy diffusion, which typically involve the government’s relative costs and benefits from 
promulgating alternative sets of policies.  
We begin by examining these domestic drivers of market-oriented policy reform. We 
then proceed to examine the effects that international coercion and emulation have on the 
diffusion process, and formulate our hypotheses. We offer an empirical test using data on 
market-oriented policy reforms in two key infrastructure sectors, telecommunications and 
electricity, over more than two decades, and find that international coercion and emulation are 
key drivers of the diffusion process.  
                                                                                                                                                             
Kogut 2004; Kogut and Macpherson 2004). Some of these studies emphasize the coercive role of 
multilateral organizations or strong states (Biglaiser and Brown 2003; Brune, Garrett, and Kogut 
2004; Brune and Guisinger 2003; Eising 2002; Finnemore 1993; Frank, Hironaka, and Schofer 
2000a; Frank, Hironaka, and Schofer 2000b; Glick and Rose 1998; Kogut and Macpherson 2004; 
McNamara and Castro 2003; Roberts 2003; Strang 1990; Strang and Chang 1993), while others 
highlight the role of emulation among peer countries (Collier and Messick 1975; Gilardi 2003; 
Guler, Guillén, and Macpherson 2002; Kobrin 1985; Simmons and Elkins 2004; Weyland 2003; 
Yebra 2002a; Yebra 2002b; Yebra 2003).  
2 Only two studies, both unpublished, consider coercion and emulation in tandem, those 
by Brune and Guisinger (2003) on capital account liberalization, and Polillo and Guillén (2004) 
on the adoption of central bank independence. 
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THE DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL CONTEXTS 
OF MARKET-ORIENTED REFORM 
 
Market-oriented policy reforms became part of the international agenda in the wake of 
the oil crises of the 1970s. At least among economists, a consensus emerged that “structural 
rigidities” caused by government intervention and excessive regulation stood in the way of 
sustainable economic growth because they tended to misallocate resources. According to this 
view, a reduction in the presence of the state in the economy through privatization and 
deregulation was necessary to enhance economic performance. Chile was the first country to 
adopt the new set of policy prescriptions during the 1970s, followed by the U.K. and the U.S. 
(Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb 2002). Market-oriented reforms diffused to other countries 
following distinct patterns shaped by both domestic and international factors. As of 1980, only 
20 countries had started to deregulate and/or privatize their electricity sector (12 in the case of 
telecommunications). By the end of 1999, the numbers had increased to 85 and 150, respectively. 
Thus, of the 205 countries and territories in the world, only 13 percent had engaged in some form 
of market-oriented reform in electricity or telecommunications as of 1980; by 1999, the figure 
had risen to 78 percent.3 
 
The Domestic Context of Market-Oriented Reform 
Much of the existing research on the diffusion of market-oriented reforms in 
infrastructure sectors such as electricity and telecommunications focuses on the domestic 
                                                 
3 See footnote 10 for sources. 
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variables that influence a country’s decision to country to adopt deregulation, privatization or 
liberalization. The arguments tends to borrow heavily from political economy, and highlight 
variables that affect policy adoption by altering policymakers’ perceived costs and benefits of 
market-oriented reform. We group these factors into demand- and supply-side pressures (Li, 
Qiang, and Xu 2002). 
 
Demand 
Sector Performance. A sharp change in economic conditions, such as a macroeconomic 
or sector-level crisis, often motivates major policy reform (Henisz and Zelner 2004). Because 
political actors are relatively certain about the outcomes that the status quo policy will produce 
but view reforms as creating uncertain long-run benefits in addition to large or uncertain short-
run (political) costs, these actors are likely to maintain the status quo (Alesina and Drazen 1991; 
Drazen and Grilli 1993; Fernandez and Rodrik 1991; Nelson 1990; Tornell 1998; Williamson 
1993). A sharp change in economic conditions may serve as a “focusing event” (Kingdon 1984: 
106) that moves reform to the top of the policymaking agenda by increasing the short-run costs 
of inaction (Hoffman 1999; Seo and Creed 2002). Only in this circumstance is radical reform 
such as a shift to market-oriented policies likely to occur (Astley 1985; Jones, Baumgartner, and 
True 1998; Romanelli and Tushman 1994). For example, Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb (2002) 
show that poorly mediated distributional conflict precipitated monetarist revolutions in Chile and 
Britain. Empirical support for this argument can also be found in sociological studies of how 
broad macroeconomic crises led to the adoption of market-oriented reform in Latin America 
(Armijo and Faucher 2001; Lora 2000; Remmer 1998), the adoption of trade reform also in Latin 
America (Biglaiser and Brown 2003), and the adoption of capital account liberalization (Brune 
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and Guisinger 2003) or privatization programs globally (Banerjee and Munger 2002). Clarke and 
Cull’s (2002) study of bank privatization in Argentina similarly implicates micro-level 
performance.  
The domestic economic factors contributing to reform in many countries also include the 
large financial burden that state-owned and state-operated sectors had placed on governments at 
a time of increasing pressure for greater operating efficiency. Because governments used state-
owned utilities as a vehicle for providing subsidies to politically important interest groups, e.g., 
labor or the middle class, an increasing fraction of capital investment had to be financed using 
general revenue rather than utility-generated profits. This imbalance became more pronounced as 
countries in Latin America, Southeast Asia and the former Eastern Bloc confronted trends such 
as input price increases, unprecedented demand growth and increased industrialization (Henisz 
and Zelner 2004).  
Because many countries failed to respond to these trends, state-owned enterprise debt 
burdens grew to enormous proportions. In Thailand, for example, the debt held by the national 
electric utility (EGAT) grew to more than US $4 billion by 1990, equivalent to over one quarter 
of the total debt held or guaranteed by the government. In Argentina, public electricity debt 
issued during the 20 years preceding the Menem presidency of 1989-99 is estimated to have 
totaled US $25 billion, equal to more than one quarter of the government’s total debt and one 
half of its foreign debt (Badaraco, Scholand, Erize, Perrone, and Werning 1996). 
Governments turned to market-oriented reforms in large part because they expected such 
reforms—especially privatization—to avert impending financial catastrophe and create a basis 
for meeting demand growth. Several studies that estimate the effect of domestic economic 
conditions on the adoption of telecommunications or electricity reform support this conjecture. 
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Petrazzini (1995) shows that poor sectoral performance was associated with market-oriented 
reforms in Latin American telecommunications. Ando and Palmer (1998), Damsgaard (2003) 
and White (1996) all find that incumbent performance increased the likelihood of adoption of 
retail price deregulation in electricity markets. Knittel (2003) finds a similar relationship in his 
study of U.S. state-level electricity regulation during the 20th century.  
A larger body of empirical work provides more indirect evidence of the influence of 
sector-level performance on the decision to adopt market-oriented reforms by demonstrating that 
deregulation, privatization and liberalization enhance the operating and financial performance of 
public utilities (D'Souza and Megginson 1999a; Megginson and Netter 2001). In the context of 
telecommunications, D’Souza and Megginson (1999b) find that profitability, output, efficiency, 
capital expenditure, lines in service, and average salary per employee all increased following the 
privatization of 26 state-owned firms in 21 countries. The increase in these measures resulted 
from efficiency gains (as opposed to price hikes), which grow further when deregulation and 
liberalization accompany privatization (Gutierrez and Berg 2000; Levy and Spiller 1994). Fink, 
Mattoo and Rathindran (2002) show that the combination of the creation of an independent 
regulator, privatization and market liberalization is associated with an eight percent higher level 
of penetration and a 21 percent higher level of productivity relative to the levels found in non-
reforming countries during a fifteen year event window. Using data on 30 countries in Africa and 
Latin America, Wallsten (2001) finds that privatization improved the performance of the 
telecommunications industry, especially when accompanied by with separation of the regulatory 
authority from the incumbent telecommunications company. Artana, Navajas and Urbiztondo 
(2001) find productivity gains of 196 percent in Argentina following deregulation and 
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privatization, and Petrazzini and Clark (1996) find that deregulation was more beneficial than 
privatization in a sample of 26 developing countries. 
Interest Groups. Regardless of the actual level of performance of state-owned utilities, the 
political strength of constituencies with intensive demand for infrastructure may also influence 
the incidence of reform. Chief among these constituencies are domestic industrial, foreign 
industrial and urban residential customers, all of which consume a disproportionately large 
quantity of infrastructure services yet also often pay relatively high rates in order to provide 
politically motivated cross-subsidies to agrarian and rural consumers (Henisz and Zelner 2004; 
Li, Qiang, and Xu 2002).4 Faced with such costs, domestic industrial, foreign industrial and 
urban residential customers may exploit their respective organizational or political advantages to 
exert concerted pressure on political actors for market-oriented infrastructure reform.  
Domestic industrial consumers’ organizational advantages follow from their relative 
concentration as a group and their possible pre-existing affiliation with one another through 
industry associations and trade groups.5 Large industrial consumers may further be able to 
threaten self-supply, increasing their bargaining leverage and political influence. Foreign 
industrial customers, on the other hand, may be able to use their home country governments to 
sway domestic policy outcomes, or may possess scarce, inimitable technology or managerial 
                                                 
4 Business consumers typically represent a more stable source of demand than residential 
consumers do and are consequently less costly to serve. Thus, higher business rates are prima 
facie evidence of cross-subsidization. Even if business prices are lower than residential prices 
are, a cross-subsidy may still be present if the difference in prices does not fully reflect the 
difference in service costs. 
5 Indeed, “producers” such as industrial firms represent the quintessential organized 
interest group in the economic theory of regulation. Stigler (1971) and Peltzman (1976; 1989), 
addressing the US private ownership context, both conceive of producers exclusively as electric 
utilities, and “consumers” is typically taken to signify diffuse, unorganized interests such as 
residential consumers. 
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capabilities that the host country government desires. Urban residential consumers derive their 
political influence from a different source, namely, their ability to militate for reform of 
infrastructure services through peaceful or violent protests, such as occurred in Indonesia in 1997 
and Argentina in 2001. 
 
Supply 
Fiscal Position. Independent of the demand for market-oriented reforms by the public or 
key interest groups, the government may be predisposed to undertake such reforms when the 
added short-term revenue from doing so helps alleviate an adverse fiscal position that threatens 
to reduce support for incumbent political actors. Because virtually all governments employ a 
form of “cash” (as opposed to accrual) accounting,6 the market-oriented reforms that facilitate 
the privatization of state assets generate short-term revenue without creating an offsetting 
balance sheet loss equal to the net present value of the future public revenues that state 
ownership of infrastructure assets would otherwise generate. Moreover, even when the loss of 
this revenue stream is implicitly noted, the increased operating efficiency that private owners of 
previously state-owned assets typically achieve leads such investors to bid above the net present 
value of the assets under government ownership, creating an incentive for governments—
especially cash-strapped ones—to undertake market-oriented reforms.  
Technology. Changes in technology have reduced the validity of the economic argument 
that infrastructure industries are “natural monopolies” in which government ownership or strict 
price regulation is necessary to safeguard consumers’ interests. A natural monopoly arises in 
                                                 
6 Only the New Zealand government follows the conventional corporate practice of 
accrual accounting, 
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industries characterized by large enough economies of scale relative to the level of demand that 
one single producer ends up monopolizing the market as a result of its continuously decreasing 
average unit costs over the entire necessary range of production. Innovations that reduce the 
impact of natural monopolies include advances in information services that permit tighter 
coordination between independent upstream and downstream stages of production, electricity 
generating technologies that reduce the minimum efficient scale of a generating plant, and new 
digital switching technology that facilitates the sharing of telecommunications infrastructure by 
multiple providers. These technological innovations have undermined traditional economic 
arguments for government intervention (Gilbert and Kahn 1996; Hirsh 1989; Joskow 1987). 
Political Institutions. The structure of domestic political institutions affects policymakers’ 
incentives (North 1990; Persson 2001; Tsebelis 2003) to adopt reforms through its influence on 
the costs of effecting actual policy change as well as investor perceptions of the credibility of 
reform (Henisz and Zelner 2001; Henisz 2002; Henisz 2004; Janeba 2001; Stasavage 2002). 
Institutions that create effective checks and balances on individual and institutional political 
actors limit the ability of such actors to alter policy unilaterally, thereby generating a status quo 
bias in policy, i.e., an increased level of policy stability (Henisz 2000; Tsebelis 2003).7  
Several cross-national empirical studies linking a country’s level of policy stability to its 
number of veto points support this contention. Hallerberg and Basinger (1998), for example, find 
that in response to tax cuts enacted by the United States in the 1980s, OECD nations with fewer 
de facto veto points lowered their tax rates by a greater amount than did countries with more 
checks and balances. Taking a longer term view, Franzese (1999) and Treismann (2000) 
                                                 
7 In macroeconomic jargon, strong institutional constraints on policymaking enhance the 
credibility of policy initiatives by increasing their “time consistency.” 
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respectively find that countries with more veto points have more stable levels of government 
deficits and inflation. MacIntyre (2001) proposes a nonlinear relationship between veto points 
and policy responses to the 1997 East Asian financial crisis and reports supporting qualitative 
evidence. Using an unbalanced panel of 92 countries over more than two decades, Henisz (2004) 
finds evidence that checks and balances reduce the volatility of fiscal expenditure and revenue. 
Accordingly, a higher level of checks and balances is expected to exert a negative influence on 
reform adoption by increasing policymakers’ private costs of reform. 
At the same time, an increased level of checks and balances should also exert a positive 
influence on reform adoption through its influence on investor perceptions. Investors provide 
capital more cheaply to countries whose domestic institutional environment offers a stronger 
safeguard against the future rollback or reversal of reforms (Henisz and Zelner 2004). The 
increased revenue-raising potential of market-oriented reforms in an institutional setting with 
strong checks and balances thus increases political actors’ potential benefit from adopting such 
reforms.  
Evidence on market-oriented reforms in telecommunications and electricity is consistent 
with the position that checks and balances promote successful reforms. A growing body of 
literature argues that a central driver of infrastructure reform is the ability of a political system to 
support credible government commitments not to intervene arbitrarily or capriciously in the 
operating practices of private infrastructure service providers (Heller and McCubbins 1996; 
Henisz and Zelner 2004; Holburn and Spiller 2003; Levy and Spiller 1994; Levy and Spiller 
1996; Spiller 1993; Spiller 1996). Investors that perceive their returns to be at risk due to 
government discretion over relevant prices, regulation, taxation, labor policy and the like tend to 
invest less, front-load their returns, shun market-oriented competition or expend resources that 
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would otherwise be operationally employed on non-market risk-reduction activities such as 
lobbying. Quantitative analysis of investment decisions in telecommunications (Henisz and 
Zelner 2001) and electricity (Henisz and Zelner 2002) reinforces the findings in the earlier 
qualitative studies.  
In sum, governments tend to adopt market-oriented reforms in response to domestic 
factors such as falling sectoral performance, interest-group pressures, a deteriorating fiscal 
position and technological changes that reduce minimum efficient scale. The “net” effect of 
checks and balances on policymaking discretion on adoption is ambiguous. The empirical 
literature has found support for these arguments using data from a variety of industries and parts 
of the world. In this paper, we measure and account for each of the domestic factors affecting 
market-oriented reforms, focusing our attention on the international context of policy diffusion. 
 
The International Context of Market-Oriented Reform 
Our theoretical arguments build on Ikenberry’s (1990) observation that “privatization 
programs across developed and developing countries can be understood only with an 
appreciation of their international context.” Following neo-institutional analysis in sociology, we 
propose coercion and emulation as the two basic mechanisms that underlie policy diffusion 
across countries. We base this argument on the assumption that nation-states are in economic, 
political and cultural competition with one another. Thus, they are influenced by power 
dynamics, and borrow policy ideas and practices from other countries in order to maintain their 
position and status in the global system of states (Gilpin 1987; Gilpin 2000; Meyer, Boli, 
Thomas, and Ramirez 1997).  
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Coercion 
Neo-institutional theory refers to the exertion of pressures for homogeneity by the state 
and other powerful actors as coercive isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Although 
much neo-institutional theorizing focuses on the domestic context, scholars have also applied the 
concept of coercive isomorphism to the interaction among countries. Meyer et al. (1997: 157) 
argue that “the expanding externally defined requirements of rational actorhood” increase the 
proclivity of more dependent actors or states in the global system to adopt formal structures or 
practices. In a global economy, most countries have become interdependent with (or dependent 
on) other countries in trade, credit and foreign investment. This interdependency induces status 
competition among states (Van Rossem 1996). Countries (or groups of countries) with more 
power in the international system, or that are viewed as possessing high status, shape the policies 
adopted by countries that are less powerful or considered less legitimate (Gilpin 1987).  
International coercion occurs when powerful actors influence the policy choices of 
governments directly, or when such actors alter the outcome of a domestic policy struggle by 
favoring the domestic coalition supporting a given policy. The former concept of “direct 
coercion” implies that domestic groups or parties that set policy simply acquiesce to international 
pressures. This depiction may sometimes approximate reality, for example, in the case of 
intervention by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the wake of a macroeconomic or 
financial crisis. Despite the fact that governments “do not want to sacrifice their sovereignty and 
have conditions imposed… they need the IMF loan and therefore accept IMF conditions because 
they have no choice” (Vreeland 2003).  
The concept of indirect coercion entails the more frequent and perhaps realistic 
assumption that there exists a diversity of views about market-oriented reforms in any given 
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country. Domestic groups may hold different views about a market-oriented reform as a result of 
their ideology or their economic interests.8 If groups have different positions on a prospective 
market-oriented reform, then the intervention of an outsider or third party can tilt the balance of 
power toward the group those favoring the reform by providing that group with more resources, 
legitimacy or rhetorical arguments, and by prompting groups to join the pro-reform coalition. 
The literature on IMF lending practices argues that intervention by external actors who provide 
short-term resources conditional on the implementation of a reform, and threaten subsequent 
direct or indirect punishments if that reform is not implemented, may alter the domestic political 
balance of power in favor of reform (Boughton 2003; Dixit 1996; Pierre 1997; Putnam 1993; 
Spaventa 1983; Vreeland 2003).  
More generally, Simmel (Simmel 1950: 145-169) theorizes about the dynamics produced 
by the intervention of a third party in a preexisting relationship between two parties. The third 
party can play one of three roles, that of the (1) non-partisan arbiter that balances or seeks accord 
between the two parties (Simmel 1950: 146) ; (2) divider-and-ruler that “intentionally produces 
the conflict in order to gain a dominant position” (Simmel 1950: 162); or (3) tertius gaudens, a 
third that enjoys influence because “either two parties are hostile toward one another and 
therefore compete for the favor of a third element; or they compete for the favor of the third 
element and therefore are hostile toward one another” (Simmel 1950: 155). The last role is most 
                                                 
8 Garrett’s (2000) study of the tendency of leftist governments to spend more and run 
higher deficits despite greater product and factor market integration highlights the persistent 
effects of ideology on policy outcomes. Boix (2000) replicates Garrett’s basic findings and 
extends them by incorporating an analysis of the structure of labor market institutions. 
Hallerberg and Basinger (1998), in their study of the adoption of tax reform, combine these two 
perspectives by considering the ideological preferences of the incumbent government as well as 
the policymaking structure. Murillo’s (2002) study of the type of the different privatization 
programs that countries adopt also finds a strong role for incumbent ideology. 
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relevant to the impact of multilateral agencies like the IMF or World Bank on deregulation, 
privatization and liberalization policies. The group or party favoring market-oriented reform may 
approach the multilateral agency in order to advance its goals (e.g., privatization), or the agency 
may approach this group or party itself. The multilateral agency itself does not necessarily have 
to exert a huge amount of influence; “the only important thing is that [the third party’s] 
superadded power give one [of the two preexisting parties] superiority” (Simmel 1950: 157). 
The available empirical evidence tends to support the argument that international 
coercion may affect policymaking either directly or indirectly. Empirical research demonstrates 
that decolonization (Strang 1990), currency crises (Glick and Rose 1998) and the adoption of 
policies to protect the environment (Frank, Hironaka, and Schofer 2000a; Frank, Hironaka, and 
Schofer 2000b) all exhibit distinct patterns of direct coercion. Dominant countries both define 
the desirable set of policies to which others aspire (Stone 1999), and can impose or encourage 
the adoption of these policies through direct financial channels such as conditional lending 
(Khan and Sharma 2001).  
Other empirical studies focus on the direct coercive influence of specific powerful 
organizations. For example, the signing of International Labor Organization conventions 
enhances subsequent welfare spending (Strang and Chang 1993), and UNESCO membership 
increases that a government founds a formal science bureaucracy (Finnemore 1993). Guler et al. 
(2002) finds that the presence of the state and foreign multinationals in the economy accelerates 
the rate of diffusion of quality certification among local firms. 
There exists limited empirical evidence of indirect coercion in the form of studies linking 
a country’s fraction of output exported to subsequent trade liberalization (Biglaiser and Brown 
2003) and demonstrating the negative impact of anti-capitalist sentiment on the adoption of 
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financial market liberalization (Quinn and Toyoda 2003). Research highlighting the use by 
international interests of local actors sharing a common vision to achieve a given domestic policy 
outcome provides additional evidence (Biglaiser and Brown 2003; Bockman and Eyal 2002; 
Chwieroth 2003).  
Much research on international coercion highlights the role of multilateral agencies, 
which control financial resources sorely needed by many countries, have a considerable amount 
of legitimacy, and typically enjoy the backing of the dominant states that contribute to them 
financially. These agencies may be able to use their resultant financial and moral authority to 
coerce domestic policy actors to adopt otherwise unacceptable reforms. More specifically, they 
promote the diffusion of market-oriented reforms through the so-called “conditionality terms” 
that they can attach to loan agreements. These terms take the form of a “complex policy 
covenant” that a debtor country’s government makes with the multilateral agency when the 
country’s lack of economic or political collateral precludes it from borrowing through 
conventional private channels. The countries that enter into such a covenant, it is argued, are 
typically those that direly need external funding to resolve an actual or impending 
macroeconomic crisis. The aim of the covenant, according to two IMF economists, is to provide 
the lender with 
safeguards that the country will be able to rectify its macroeconomic and structural 
imbalances and will be in a position to service and repay the loan… Certain structural 
conditions may be necessary to signal the government’s commitment to 
macroeconomic stability. Securing this depends not only on short-run macroeconomic 
management given an existing set of institutions, but also on the quality of the 
institutions themselves… Institutional development and reform require a variety of 
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structural policy changes and this is a justification for including them in programs 
(Khan and Sharma 2001: 6). 
The first amendment to the IMF charter, passed in 1952, granted the agency the ability to 
seek policy changes in debtor countries. The actual imposition of conditionality terms by the 
development agencies was initially rare and the terms imposed narrow in scope. However, the 
average number of terms imposed on a borrowing country has risen substantially in recent years, 
especially during the 1990s. The IMF imposed an average of six terms in 1970, 10 in the 1980s, 
and 26 by 1999, with a maximum of 140 in the case of Indonesia in 1997. The average for the 
World Bank rose from 32 in 1980-83 to 56 by 1990 (Buira 2003).  
Some observers attribute the change in multilateral agency behavior to ideological shifts 
that began in the 1980s. According to Buira (2003), “since the early 1980s, as the Thatcher and 
Reagan doctrines gained ascendancy in the UK and the US, both [the IMF and the World Bank] 
adopted a more neo-liberal economic stance and increasingly favored policies aimed at reducing 
the role of the state, the reduction or elimination of subsidies, of market liberalization and 
privatization of public enterprises.” As Kapur and Webb (2000) report, the dominant ideology at 
the World Bank during the 1980s revolved around the theme that countries should do more with 
less—that is, “downsize”—and evolved during the 1990s to include broad privatization 
programs, regulatory reform and the implementation of checks and balances as recognition of 
domestic institutional factors grew.9 
                                                 
9 From a conceptual perspective, it is possible to conjecture that changes in development 
agency behavior may also have resulted from the growing legitimacy of agencies’ conditionality 
practices over time, both internally and throughout the field of development agencies. However, 
the identification of the precise explanation for changes in development agency behavior is, 
however, beyond the scope of this paper. 
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The World Bank explicitly extended this macroeconomic ideology to infrastructure 
sectors in 1993, when it made evidence of market-oriented infrastructure reform precondition for 
any project lending. One example is the Democratic Republic of Congo, which borrowed $120 
million under the condition that it “strengthen regulatory authorities in the telecommunication, 
transport and energy sectors through technical assistance and training” (The World Bank 2004b). 
Another example is Afghanistan, which recently borrowed $22 million “to set up an independent 
Regulatory Commission (RC) and [formulate] a Telecommunications Act… Plans for eventual 
privatization will be augmented by an institutional strengthening exercise to ensure 
administration procedures and accountability meet all international quality and performance 
expectations” (The World Bank 2004a). Similarly, Bangladesh borrowed $9 million in order “to 
improve the performance of [its] telecommunications sector through strengthening elements of 
the policy, institutional, and regulatory framework in order to promote the competitive provision 
of telecommunications infrastructure and services” (The World Bank 2004c). The Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Afghanistan and Bangladesh are but three of the countries that have received 
infrastructure loans under the condition of market-oriented reform since the IMF and World 
Bank began to publish the terms of their loan agreements in 1997. Wamukonya (2003) shows 
that 32 countries signed letters of intent with the World Bank for lending in the electricity sector 
that included similar terms over the period from October 1998 to February 2001.  
Unpublished empirical studies find evidence of the coercive influence of multilateral 
agencies on the likelihood of capital account liberalization (Brune and Guisinger 2003), the 
adoption of central bank independence (McNamara and Castro 2003), the promulgation of a 
national right to information or transparency laws around the world (Roberts 2003), and the 
adoption of tariff reform in Latin America (Biglaiser and Brown 2003). 
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We expect direct coercion to occur in cases in which the multilaterals (and the states that 
dominate their decision-making) are powerful enough relative to a country’s government to 
impose market-oriented reforms in exchange for funding. In other cases, we expect indirect 
coercion to occur: the IMF or the World Bank and domestic parties in favor of market-oriented 
reform work in concert to tilt the balance of power, especially when the country requires external 
funding to cope with a macroeconomic or financial crisis. Whichever coercive mechanism is 
operative, external intervention still affects the policymaking process. Based on the foregoing, 
we predict that: 
 
Hypothesis 1a:  The rate of adoption of market-oriented reform increases with 
exposure to multilateral lenders. 
 
Consistent with the anecdotal observations reported above regarding the increased scope of 
multilateral conditionality over time, we also predict that 
 
Hypothesis 1b:  The magnitude of the positive correlation between the rate of 
adoption of market-oriented reform and exposure to multilateral lenders is increasing 
over time. 
 
Emulation 
In addition to coercion, a social structure may induce emulation or mimetic behavior 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Mimetic isomorphism refers to the tendency of actors to seek 
legitimacy by emulating the behavior or practices of other actors. This process occurs more 
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frequently when there is uncertainty about the effectiveness of practices or policies, and when 
the range of possible alternatives becomes so large that rationally-bounded actors find it difficult 
or impractical to assess each possible alternative against the others. As Strang and Macy (2001) 
note, adaptive emulation combines problem-driven search (March and Simon 1958) and 
organizational imitation (DiMaggio and Powell 1983).  
Social contact is the best documented channel through which mimetic isomorphism 
occurs. Actors tied to one another share a culture or set of norms that invites them to behave 
similarly; socially cohesive actors influence each other and hence tend to adopt similar patterns 
of behavior (Coleman 1988). The extent of imitation thus depends on patterns of interaction 
between pairs of actors, which is in turn a function of social density. Empirical evidence 
supporting this argument comes from studies examining the diffusion across organizations of 
practices such as corporate acquisitions (Haunschild 1993), poison pills (Davis 1991), golden 
parachutes (Davis and Greve 1997), technological innovations (Ahuja 2000), total quality 
management techniques (Westphal, Gulati, and Shortell 1997), and the multidivisional form 
(Palmer, Jennings, and Zhou 1993). This body of research emphasizes the importance of such 
interorganizational ties as interlocking directorates and the transfer of managerial personnel, 
which provide channels for the exchange of information.  
Some neo-institutional sociologists apply the concept of mimetic isomorphism at the 
country level of analysis, arguing that policymakers emulate each other as a way to reduce search 
costs and appear legitimate (Jepperson and Meyer 1991; Meyer, Boli, Thomas, and Ramirez 
1997). Case study and historical research document that government officials and bureaucrats 
constantly assess policy and organizational developments in other countries. Westney (1987) 
provides historical evidence for the Japanese case during the period of Meiji reform in the late 
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19th and early 20th centuries. Guillén (1994) and Djelic (1998) show that governments in Western 
Europe sought to emulate American productivity programs before and after World War II. Using 
more recent evidence, some researchers show that the “menu” of known policy options from 
which policymakers choose today is considerably larger than that available to their counterparts 
several decades ago. Recognition that the range of options has grown over time is critical for 
predicting the timing of adoption of a given reform. Empirical studies emphasizing policy 
emulation among peers include Collier and Messick’s (1975) study of the adoption of social 
security systems, Knoke’s (1982) analysis of the adoption of municipal reform in the 267 largest 
US cities, Kobrin’s (1985) study of oil nationalization, Weyland’s (2003) work on the diffusion 
of pension privatization, Guler et al.’s (2002) study of the adoption of quality certification, Brune 
and Guisinger’s (2003) analysis of capital account liberalization, and Fourcade-Gourinchas and 
Babb’s (2002) and Yebra’s (2002a; 2003) studies of the diffusion of neoliberal macroeconomic 
policies. 
Sociologists studying globalization argue that the intensity of trade transactions reflects 
the density of the social network in which a given country is embedded (Albrow 1997: 25; Van 
Rossem 1996) and therefore the level of formalized conformity within the network. Trade comes 
hand in hand with “cultural ties” (Waters 1995: 40) and thus contributes to “establishing a 
relationship of identification as well as interdependence.” For example, Japanese success in 
exporting to the U.S. market prompted many American firms to experiment with such Japanese 
organizational techniques as total quality management or lean production (Strang and Macy 
2001). 
Policies directly reflect the level of formalized conformity within a trade network. In a 
world characterized by uncertain cause-effect relationships, the policy initiatives undertaken by 
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“relevant others” such as trade partners represent a normative model that lends credence to 
analogous domestic policy innovations and may trigger a cross-national diffusion process. 
Imitation is an effective policymaking strategy under conditions of uncertainty and bounded 
rationality because it helps decision-makers keep search costs within reasonable limits, sort out 
alternatives and legitimize their actions. Thus, we predict: 
Hypothesis 2: The rate of adoption of market-oriented reform by a given country 
increases with the incidence of adoption of such reforms by trade-related countries. 
 
EMPIRICAL SETTING, DATA, AND METHODS 
 
The empirical focus of our analysis is the wave of market-oriented reforms that have 
taken place in the global telecommunications and electricity industries since the late 1970s. As in 
the case of other infrastructure industries, telecommunications and electricity providers in most 
countries were traditionally state-owned monopolies. Even where several firms were allowed to 
operate, competition on price or product offerings was rarely allowed to occur. 
During the 1960s and 1970s, fewer than half a dozen countries initiated major reforms in 
the regulation of, degree of private ownership of or extent of competition among 
telecommunications and electricity providers. Market-oriented reforms began to gather speed in 
the 1980s. During the 1990s over two thirds of all countries and territories in the world 
introduced at least one major market-oriented reform in telecommunications, while over one 
third did so in the case of electricity (see Table 1). Early adopters and the countries that have 
adopted the most comprehensive reforms represent a wide variety of geographic regions, income 
levels and development levels. Table 2 lists the first 15 adopters in both sectors and the 15 
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countries that most rapidly adopted the most wide-ranging and comprehensive set of reforms 
including deregulation, privatization and liberalization. 
 
 
Data 
We test our hypotheses using an unbalanced cross-national panel data set of reforms in up 
to 205 countries during the period 1960-1999. The unit of analysis is the country-year. Data on 
the timing of reforms in infrastructure services are drawn from multiple secondary sources 
including intergovernmental organizations (The International Telecommunications Union, 
known as the ITU, and The International Energy Agency, known as the IEA), national regulatory 
agencies, press reports and third-party analyses.10 These data are combined with macroeconomic 
information from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, sector-specific information 
from the ITU and IEA, and political data from the Political Constraints Database.11 
Dependent Variables. We run separate regressions for telecommunications and 
electricity. Our data include the year in which a country adopted a specific reform in the areas of 
deregulation, privatization and liberalization. For the former, we consider four possible reforms: 
(1) separating the regulatory authority from the ministry with oversight of the sector; (2) 
separating the regulatory authority from the state-owned operator; (3) creating a semi-
autonomous regulator; and (4) creating an autonomous regulator. For the privatization variables, 
                                                 
10 The telecommunications reform variables come from the International 
Telecommunications Union. For the electricity reform variables, we supplemented data available 
from the International Energy Agency with the OECD International Regulation Database, the 
World Bank’s International Directory of Utility Regulatory Institutions, and the websites of 
national regulatory agencies and ministries. 
11 http://www-management.wharton.upenn.edu/henisz/POLCON/ContactInfo.html 
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we consider three possible reforms: (1) undertaking a privatization of a minority of the shares of 
the state-owned provider; (2) undertaking a privatization of the majority of shares of the state-
owned provider; and (3) undertaking a complete privatization of the state-owned provider. For 
the liberalization variables, we consider two reforms in each of the respective cases of 
telecommunications and electricity: (1) allowing competition in long distance telephony, or 
autoproduction in electricity; and (2) allowing competition in local telephony, or generation for 
external sale in electricity. We thus have nine potential adoption decisions in each sector and in 
each country-year.  
Table 1 shows the number of countries that have enacted each reform by decade, the 
number of left-censored cases (those countries that had already enacted a given reform prior to 
1960) and the number right-censored cases (those countries that had not yet enacted the reform 
as of 1999). Appendix Tables 1 and 2 provide the year in which each of the 205 (196) countries 
in our dataset undertook each of the above reforms in telecommunications (electricity).  
Independent Variables. We measure the leverage of multilateral lenders using the ratio 
of a country’s level of borrowing to Gross Domestic Product. Compared to the alternative 
measure of actual infrastructure project-based loan agreements, the total exposure measure that 
we use is not limited by a country’s short-term need for infrastructure borrowing nor is it 
associated with a country’s desire to implement market-oriented infrastructure reforms, and is 
therefore both robust to possible unobserved extra-sectoral linkages in country loan packages and 
more independent from the domestic political economic factors which may generate pressure for 
reform. For example, in the prominent cases of a $46 billion Indonesian lending program in 1997 
and a $2.6 billion program to the Ukraine in 2001, disagreements about the attainment of or 
commitment to market-oriented infrastructure reforms delayed a lending package for a country in 
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the midst of an exogenous macroeconomic and financial crisis. Even were we to set aside issues 
of endogeneity, data on the contents of individual loans, were made public beginning only in 
1998.  
The countries with the highest overall exposure to multilateral lenders were São Tomé & 
Principe, Guyana, Malawi, Zambia, Guinnea-Bissau, Gambia, Burundi, Mauritania, Togo, 
Ghana, Mali and Sierra Leone. The country-years in which the multilateral lending agencies had 
the highest leverage according to this measure were São Tomé & Principe from 1992-99, 
Guinea-Bissau from 1995-99, Malawi from 1995-99, Guyana from 1992-94 and Zambia in 1987. 
Country-years in which multilateral leverage increased by the greatest amount were Malawi in 
1994, Rwanda in 1994, Bosnia in 1994, Sao Tome & Principe in 1991 and Malawi in 1998. 
Anecdotal support in the form of case studies or news stories about the effect of multilateral 
lending (H1a) can be found in the telecommunications reform adoption decisions of São Tomé & 
Principe (1997), Malawi (1998), Guyana (1991), Zambia (1994), Guinea-Bissau (1989), Burundi 
(1997), Mauritania (1999), Togo (1999), Ghana (1996), Rwanda (1996) and Bosnia (1999). 
Guyana (1998), Ghana (1997) and Zambia (1997) also adopted electricity sector reforms.  
We measure the legitimacy attributed to a given reform—and thus its mimetic appeal—
using the prior reform decisions of other countries. Rather than just count prior adoptions of an 
analogous reform in the telecommunications or electricity sector, we construct a country-reform 
specific policy index that accords more weight to the prior adoption decisions of more closely-
tied (i.e., peer) countries about a specific reform, as measured by the share of their total trade that 
occurs with the focal country (Yebra 2002b). This indicator reflects the notion that, because of 
uncertainty and bounded rationality, policymakers take into consideration their peers’ decisions.  
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The differences between the means of these variables in the entire sample as opposed to 
the subsample of adopters and non-adopters reflect the strong clustering of adoption decisions. In 
the case of the nine telecommunications reforms, 20.4 percent of the average country’s trade 
during the sample period was with countries that had adopted a given reform. For countries that 
had already adopted a reform, however, this figure was 46.8 percent, as opposed to 17.8 percent 
for non-adopters. Similarly, in the case of electricity the figure of 34.1 percent fell in between the 
figure for adopters of 78.9 percent and non-adopters of 24.5 percent. 
Control Variables. We include additional independent variables to reflect domestic 
factors such as sectoral performance, interest-group pressures, fiscal position, technological 
changes, and checks and balances. We use the ratio of the number of customers waiting for 
telecommunications services to the number of customers currently served as a proxy for the 
quality of telecommunications services (Petrazzini 1995), and the percentage of electricity that is 
generated but lost in transmission or distribution as a proxy for the quality of the electric system. 
A high value of either measure indicates a clear performance shortfall in the sector. Each 
measure is more widely available than potential alternatives such as the percentage of calls 
completed, hours of brownouts or blackouts, and various productivity metrics. The countries 
with the worst performance according to these metrics (Afghanistan, Albania, Syria, Cambodia, 
Nepal, Eritrea, Honduras, Libya, Vietnam, Tanzania and Tonga in the case of 
telecommunications; and Armenia, Haiti, Latvia, Mozambique, Myanamar, Bangladesh, Cyprus, 
Angola and the Dominican Republic in the case of electricity) are plausible candidates for having 
poorly performing state-owned enterprises. We measure interest group pressures using the value 
added in industrial production as a share of gross domestic product, the ratio of foreign direct 
investment to gross domestic product, and the percentage of the population living in urban areas.  
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Turning to supply-side factors, we include the public sector budget balance to capture 
fiscal strain. We allow for the impact of technological change by permitting the hazard rate of 
adoption to increase over time as a function of an estimated parameter in our specification, as 
described below. Finally, in order to account for the role of any scale (dis)economies as country 
size increases, we also include the log of a country’s population. Additionally, we include the log 
of per capita GDP as a crude measure of resources and economic structure.  
Table 2 provides summary statistics for the dependent and independent variables in our 
analysis. We lag all independent variables one period to help alleviate concerns regarding 
potential endogeneity. 
 
Methods 
We estimate policy reform adoption rates using an event history analysis, a technique that 
assesses the influence of a set of covariates on the incidence of an event using a longitudinal 
record of events in a sample from a population. Our focal event is the adoption of a reform by a 
country in a given year. In our model, each country x is at risk of adopting reform i in each time 
period t, or until adoption occurs. This technique models the rate of a transition from an origin 
state to a destination state (adoption) as a function of the covariates. Its general form is: 
βρ λρλ jtXetth == − ,)( 1  
where h(t) is the hazard function for a reform to transition from non-adoption to adoption at time 
t, with the observed covariate row vectors Xjt and parameters to be estimated ρ and β (Blossfeld 
and Rohwer 1995).  
In our primary specification, we combine all nine possible reforms in each sector of each 
country into a single, pooled, cross-national, sector-level regression, although we examine results 
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at individual reform level in our robustness tests. We allow for each type of reform to have an 
independent baseline hazard and a different sensitivity to the passage of time, i.e., ρ is 
subscripted by reform type (Wei, Lin, and Weissfeld 1989), resulting in a vector ρ. In order to 
test support for Hypothesis 1b (the time-varying effect of multilateral lending), we also include 
the multilateral lending variable in ρ. The effect of all other independent variables is assumed to 
be constant across time t. We explicitly test this assumption in our robustness analysis by 
permitting the effect of the multilateral lending variable and other independent variables to affect 
individual reform types differentially. Finally, we cluster the standard errors by country in order 
to address the lack of independence of multiple observations from the same cross-sectional unit.  
Based on a review of the dates of initial reform in each sector across countries, we choose 
1977 and 1978 (when Chile adopted market-oriented reforms) as the base year for analysis of the 
telecommunications and electricity generation sectors, respectively, reflecting an assumption that 
the adoption of sectoral reform was not a relevant policy option prior to that year. In our 
robustness tests we also examine the sensitivity of our results to this assumption. 
Finally, given our acknowledgement of the role of domestic economic and political 
factors in reform adoption and the role ascribed to these same factors in Vreeland’s (2003) 
analysis of a government’s decision to adopt an IMF program, we allow for the possibility that 
countries’ choices to ask multilateral lenders for a loan and adopt market-oriented infrastructure 
reforms are simultaneously determined. Specifically, we employ a two-stage model whose first 
stage mirrors Vreeland’s (2003) depiction of the domestic economic and political factors that 
influence the adoption of a multilateral lending program, and whose second stage includes the 
variables listed above in addition to the predicted probability of seeking a multilateral loan from 
the first-stage regression.  
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EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Model 1 of Table 4—the first-stage equation—shows that we replicate Vreeland’s (2003) 
main findings that low official reserves, large government budget deficits, high debt service 
obligations, new governments and a smaller number of checks and balances in the nation’s 
political institutions are all associated with a greater predicted probability of a country’s 
increasing its multilateral exposure. We also find that smaller (p = 0.06) and poorer countries are 
more likely to increase their exposure. Columns 2 – 5 of Table 4 present the results of our 
analysis of the telecommunications (columns 2 – 3) and electricity sectors (columns 4 – 5). The 
second model for each sector (Columns 3 and 5) allow for a time-varying effect of multilateral 
lending. 
We find strong support for the coercive effect of multilateral lending and reform adoption 
in both telecommunications and electricity (H1a). That is, the World Bank and International 
Monetary Fund’s conditional lending practices increase the rate at which countries adopt market-
oriented infrastructure reforms. When we restrict the effect of multilateral lending to be constant 
across time (columns 2 and 4), a country borrowing the sample mean level from multilateral 
institutions is predicted to be approximately 38 percent more likely to adopt a reform in the 
telecommunications sector as compared to a country with no exposure to multilateral institutions 
(the analogous result is not significant in the case of electricity). A country with exposure one 
standard deviation above the mean is predicted to be 50 percent more likely to adopt a reform 
than is a country with exposure at the mean level, or 107 percent more than is a country with no 
exposure. For severely indebted countries, i.e., those whose borrowing from multilaterals 
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exceeds the value of their gross domestic product, the total predicted increase in the rate of 
reform adoption is 1,233 per cent. 
Consistent with H1b, the economic magnitude of the effect of this coercive mechanism 
varies substantially with time. According to the coefficient estimates in columns 3 and 5, from 
the specifications in which the effect of multilateral lending is permitted to vary over time, 
countries whose exposure to multilateral institutions in 1987 is at the mean, one standard 
deviation above the mean, or greater than gross domestic product are respectively predicted to be 
27 percent, 60 percent and 606 percent more likely to adopt a reform in the telecommunications 
sector, when compared to countries with no multilateral exposure. These figures increase to 36 
percent, 103 percent and 1,191 percent in 1997. In the case of the electricity sector, the effects 
are now statistically significant and comparable in magnitude to those of the telecommunications 
sector. Specifically, countries whose exposure to multilateral institutions is at the mean, one 
standard deviation above the mean, or equal to their gross domestic product are predicted to 
increase their adoption rates by 42 percent, 123 percent and 2462 percent in 1987 and 51 percent, 
151 percent and 621 percent in 1997, as compared to countries with no multilateral exposure.12 
Hypothesis 2 posits a positive relationship between peer countries’ adoption of a reform 
and a focal country’s adoption rate. We find strong support for this hypothesis in both sectors 
and the economic significance is again substantial. In the case of telecommunications, countries 
with trading partners that have undertaken a specific sector-level reform at a rate one standard 
deviation above the mean level for that year exhibit predicted adoption rates that are 89 percent 
                                                 
12 The predicted rate of increase in reform adoption for severely indebted countries in 
1997 is lower than it is in 1987 because the model predicts that all countries with such exposure 
would initiate a reform by the early 1990s, thus reaching the upper bound on the rate of adoption 
above which there are no possible predicted increases. 
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higher than are those of countries whose trading partners exhibit the mean level of reform. The 
analogous figure for the electricity sector is 145 percent. Thus, we obtain robust, statistically 
significant support for the presence of both international coercion and emulation. Moreover, the 
effects are large in magnitude. 
In contrast, we find mixed support for the role of domestic demand and supply factors, 
which we included in our analyses as control variables. The models support the expected positive 
relationship between performance shortfalls and the adoption of reforms in both sectors. 
Consumers facing waiting lists for telecommunications services or whose electric utilities are 
able to supply only a fraction of the electricity generated are more likely to militate for reform. 
The predicted adoption rate for sectoral reform in a country whose sectoral performance 
indicator is one standard deviation lower than the mean level is 115 percent higher in the case of 
telecommunications and 84 percent higher in the case of electricity than in an otherwise identical 
country at the mean level of the performance indicator. 
The flexibility of the Weibull specification permits us to infer that the baseline adoption 
rate is initially much higher for telecommunications, but the rate of change over time for 
electricity reforms is much more rapid (i.e., the coefficient estimate for the time-varying constant 
for electricity is equal to 40 percent of the time-varying constant for telecommunications), 
suggesting that technological change has played a larger role in enabling market-oriented 
reforms in the latter sector. Although this finding may appear counterintuitive at first blush, it is 
important to recall that our empirical analysis examines fixed-line telecommunications 
infrastructure that supports voice services, not the overlapping data or cellular markets in which 
technological change has played a much greater role. In the electricity sector, the substantial 
decline in the minimum efficient scale of generating plants has radically altered the economics of 
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generation during the past few decades, enabling the vertical disintegration that is a crucial 
component of market-oriented the reforms to occur. 
We do not find a statistically significant relationship between interest group pressures 
(value added by industry, urban population or foreign direct investment) or political institutions 
(political constraints) and the adoption of reforms. Countries with larger budget surpluses are 
more likely to reform in the case of telecommunications, highlighting the need for slack 
resources to fund the necessary transformation of the sector rather than suggesting that resource 
scarcity drives the government to reform.13 Larger countries are more likely to reform, although 
the statistical support is within conventional confidence intervals only in the case of the 
electricity sector. 
Another way of examining the predictive power of our model is to review the post-1999 
experience of non-adopting countries with the maximum predicted probabilities of adopting a 
given reform in 1999. In the telecommunications sector, the International Telecommunications 
Union dataset contains observations beyond the 1999 threshold that we use in our analysis. In 
1999, the countries with the highest probability of making their regulator independent from the 
Ministry of Telecommunications that had not yet done so were Uruguay, Romania and Latvia. 
Uruguay and Latvia adopted this reform in 2001, and Romania did so in 2002. For the case of 
making the regulator independent from the incumbent, the non-adopters with the highest 
predicted adoption rate were Azerbaijan, Uruguay and Belarus. Uruguay adopted this reform in 
2001 while Azerbaijan and Belarus have yet to do so. For the subjective measures of 
                                                 
13 This result exclusively reflects the impact of the size of a country’s budget deficit on 
the probability of reform, i.e., net of the impact of the budget deficit on the probability of the 
country’s increasing its multilateral institutions. The latter effect is captured in the first stage of 
the econometric model, which indicates that the budget deficit is a crucial determinant a 
country’s choice to increase its multilateral exposure.  
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deregulation, Mexico, Chile and Tunisia had the highest probability of making their regulator 
autonomous, and Tunisia did so in 2001. Estonia, Lithuania and Azerbaijan had the highest 
predicted probability of initiating a privatization program, and Estonia did so in 2000, followed 
by Lithuania in 2001. The highest predicted rates of adoption of competition in long distance 
telephony among non-adopters were those for Poland, the Czech Republic and Estonia. The 
latter two countries adopted this reform in 2000, and Poland followed in 2001. Finally, for non-
adopters of competition in local services, the highest predicted rates of adoption were those for 
Mexico, Estonia and Hungary, each of which adopted the reform in 2000. 
 
Robustness Analyses 
We examine the robustness of our results to the inclusion of additional variables, 
different choices of base year, different time-varying effects and the disaggregation of our 
dependent variable.  
Omitted Variables. We check for omitted variable bias by adding to our core 
specifications covariates that could plausibly influence the dependent variable, including the 
level of democratization, the durability of the political regime, any change in political leadership, 
the ideology of the political leadership, two measures of the openness of the host country 
economy (trade and portfolio investment), two measures of the level of debt service (as a 
percentage of GDP and exports), two measures of the size of government (expenditure and 
revenue), and two measures of host country growth prospects (population and income). Given 
the stability of our coefficient estimates, we present an abbreviated version of the results in Table 
5, which includes the coefficient estimates of theoretical interest and the coefficient estimate for 
the rotated variable for each of the twelve different equations for electricity and 
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telecommunications, in specifications that both restrict the effect of multilateral lending to be 
constant across time and also allow it to vary over time (a total of 48 regressions). For 
telecommunications, democratic countries (column 1, panels 1 and 2) and (weakly) countries in 
which the government plays a smaller role in the economy, as measured by expenditure or 
revenue (columns 9-10, panels 1-2), are more likely to initiate market-oriented reforms. Only 
population growth (column 11, panels 3-4) is associated with market-oriented reforms in the 
electricity sector. Except in the case of ideology (column 4), the coefficient estimate for which is 
not itself significant and whose inclusion reduces our sample size by over forty percent, the 
inclusion of any these variables does not substantively alter the results of primary interest. We do 
not include these variables in our primary specification due to the reduction in sample size that 
doing so would necessitate. 
Assumptions about Initial Reform Year. We examine the sensitivity of our results to 
varying assumptions about the initial year in which reform was a feasible policy option by 
setting the initial year in our analyses to 1960 (the earliest year for which we have data) for both 
sectors, and also to the years of the second and third significant reforms in each sector (1979 and 
1984 for telecommunications, 1986 and 1987 for electricity). The coefficient estimates for the 
multilateral exposure variable in Table 6 increase as we move the initial date of our analysis 
forward in time. This change is consistent with the support for Hypothesis 1b (the time-varying 
effect of multilateral lending); the predicted effect of a given quantity of lending is increasing as 
we restrict our sample to include only more recent years. We do, however, lose some statistical 
power as we restrict the sample size to the 1984-1999 period for telecommunications and 1986-
1999 for electricity. All of the other results for both sectors are robust to changes in the base year 
of analysis. 
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Time-Varying Coefficient Estimates. In Table 7 we examine whether our result that 
multilateral lending has a time-varying effect of could be an artifact of a poorly specified hazard 
function or other mishandling of the effect of the passage of time. Specifically, we allow the 
effect of trade-weighted peer adoption (columns 1 and 7) and the sector-level performance 
indicator (columns 2 and 8) to vary over time. We also test models in which each of these 
variables as well as the multilateral lending variable is allowed to have a time-varying effect 
(columns 3, 5, 9 and 11), and in which all three variables are allowed to have a time-varying 
effect (columns 6 and 12). While we find some weak evidence of a time-varying effect for peer 
adoption, the loosening of any of these restrictions does not alter the support for our hypotheses.  
Disaggregation of the Dependent Variable. In Tables 8 and 10, we disaggregate our 
dependent variable to focus on five types of market-oriented reforms (deregulation, objectively-
measured deregulation, subjectively-measured deregulation, privatization and liberalization). 
Tables 9 and 11 report results for each of the nine individual reforms in each sector. As we are 
no longer pooling our nine reform types together for each country year but are rather looking at 
smaller groups of reforms (Tables 8 and 10) or single reforms per country year (Tables 9 and 
11), the samples are substantially smaller than our primary estimating sample, resulting in a 
substantial loss of statistical power, particularly in Tables 9 and 11.  
In both telecommunications and electricity, multilateral lending is most strongly 
associated with the subsequent adoption of objectively-measured deregulation (the separation of 
the regulator from the ministry and from the incumbent state-owned operator, as indicated in 
columns 3 of Tables 8 and 10 and columns 1 and 3 of Tables 9 and 11). In the case of 
telecommunications, this effect increases over time (column 4 of Table 8 and columns 2 and 4 of 
Table 9).  
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The effect of multilateral lending on other reforms varies more between sectors. In 
telecommunications, there is no impact on the aggregated subjectively-measured deregulation 
(columns 5 – 6 of Table 8). There is weak evidence of an initially negative association between 
multilateral lending and regulatory semi-autonomy, which diminishes over time and eventually 
becomes positive (columns 5 – 6 of Table 9), and an increasingly positive effect on regulatory 
autonomy over time (column 8 of Table 9). Other results for the telecommunications sector 
include a strong, time-invariant impact on the aggregated privatization measure (column 7 of 
Table 8), which seems to be concentrated on minority rather than majority privatizations 
(columns 9 – 14 of Table 9), no impact on the aggregated liberalization measure (columns 9 – 20 
of Table 8), and evidence of a positive and declining effect on liberalization of local telephony 
(columns 17 – 18 of Table 9).  
In the electricity sector, there is a positive but time-invariant effect on subjectively-
measured deregulation (columns 5 – 6 of Table 10) that appears concentrated on regulatory semi-
autonomy (columns 5 – 8 of Table 11); mixed evidence of a positive effect on aggregate 
privatization (columns 7 – 8 of Table 10) that, when unpacked, shows a strong negative 
association between multilateral lending and minority privatization (columns 9 – 10 of Table 11) 
and a strong positive association with majority and full privatization that declines over time 
(columns 11 – 14 of Table 11); and an initially negative effect on liberalization that declines in 
magnitude and eventually becomes positive (columns 9 – 10 of Table 11), which is concentrated 
on the existence of private generating companies (columns 17 – 18 of Table 11) as opposed to 
autogeneration (columns 15 – 16 of Table 11). 
The effect of trade-weighted peer adoption is relatively robust in the telecommunications 
sector with a loss of statistical support only in the cases of liberalization (columns 9 – 10 of 
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Table 8) particularly of local telephony (columns 17 – 18 of Table 9), regulatory semi-autonomy 
(columns 5 – 6 of Table 9) and full or majority privatization (columns 11 – 14 of Table 9). The 
positive aggregate effect of peer adoption in the electricity sector is, however, entirely 
concentrated in the adoption of liberalization reforms (columns 9 – 10 of Table 10) specifically, 
the allowance of autogeneration (columns 15 – 16 of Table 11). 
Disaggregating the results also uncovers some additional statistically significant 
relationships between several of our control variables and types of reforms or individual reforms. 
For example, the effect of sectoral performance is concentrated on objective measures of 
deregulation in telecommunications (columns 3 – 4 of Table 8), particularly making the regulator 
independent from the incumbent (columns 3 – 4 of Table 9) as well as supporting full 
privatization (columns 13 – 14 of Table 9). In the case of electricity, poor performance is again 
associated with objective measures of deregulation (columns 3 – 4 of Table 9 and columns 1 – 4 
of Table 11) as well as regulatory semi-autonomy (columns 5 – 6 of Table 11) and the existence 
of private generators (columns 17 – 18 of Table 11). 
We now find evidence of interest group effects on telecommunications privatization 
(columns 7 – 8 of Table 8), wherein the industrial lobby favors minority privatization (columns 
9 – 10 of Table 9), foreign investors favor full privatization (columns 13 – 14 of Table 9) and 
urban consumers prefer privatization in the aggregate (columns 7 – 8 of Table 8). Foreign 
investors, similarly prefer privatization in electricity (columns 7 – 10 of Table 10) particularly 
majority privatization (columns 11 – 12 of Table 11). Industrial consumers again prefer minority 
privatization (columns 9 – 10 of Table 11) and are now opposed to majority privatization 
(columns 11 – 12 of Table 11). Urban consumers prefer majority or (weakly) full privatization 
(columns 11 – 14 of Table 11).  
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There is also evidence that countries with strong checks and balances in their political 
institutions are more likely to adopt privatization (columns 7 – 8 of Table 8) and liberalization 
(columns 9 – 10 of Table 8) reforms in telecommunications. The effect of checks and balances 
on privatization appears concentrated on minority privatizations (columns 9 – 10 of Table 9), 
whereas the effect on liberalization is significant for both long distance (columns 15 -16 of Table 
9) and local service (columns 17 – 18 of Table 9), albeit much stronger in the latter case. Checks 
and balances are again positively associated with minority privatization in the case of the 
electricity sector (columns 9 – 10 of Table 11), although now they are negatively associated with 
full privatization (columns 13 – 14 of Table 11). Finally, larger countries are more likely to adopt 
telecommunications privatization (columns 7 – 8 of Table 8), particularly full privatization 
(columns 13 – 14 of Table 9) and liberalization (columns 9 – 10 of Table 8 and 15 – 18 of Table 
9). 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
The theoretical and empirical analysis in this paper extends prior work on the impact of 
coercion and emulation in an international setting by demonstrating that these institutional forces 
affect policy outcomes in conjunction with domestic economic and political factors. Countries 
adopt market-oriented policy reforms in telecommunications and electricity as external actors 
with coercive power gain leverage over the domestic policymaking apparatus, and as the 
legitimacy of reforms grows through their prior adoption by peer countries. Thus, our analysis 
lends credence to the neo-institutional approach to diffusion, which can be fruitfully applied to 
the interaction among nation-states in the global system. Our findings are consistent with prior 
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research proposing or demonstrating that early adopters are motivated to a greater extent by 
efficiency motives than are later adopters, who are influenced more strongly by coercive or 
mimetic isomorphic pressures (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Westphal, Gulati, and Shortell 
1997). Not only has the importance of isomorphic pressures increased over time due to the 
widespread diffusion of market-oriented reforms and the growing role of multilateral 
development agencies in international lending, but it is also the case that coercive pressures have 
increased over time for a given amount of multilateral lending. 
One issue that we are unable to resolve is the precise mechanism through which external 
funding or prior adoption influences policy outcomes. We cannot separate direct coercion by 
multilateral lenders from the indirect empowerment of domestic political actors to achieve their 
desired policy outcomes. A more complex division exists in the case of mechanisms driving 
international emulation, which may include (boundedly) rational learning processes, coercive or 
normative isomorphism, and institutional pressure for conformity in appearance regardless of 
function (Gilardi 2003; Weyland 2003). Differentiating between these causal mechanisms is 
problematic even under ideal empirical circumstances due to the observational equivalence of 
many of the underlying propositions. The limitations of our international dataset compound this 
problem and we do not attempt to weigh in on these longstanding debates. 
Our empirical evidence sheds light on the determinants of policy reform. Much previous 
scholarship in this area has focused on domestic economic and political conditions as 
explanatory factors. We concur that performance shortfalls generate pressure for policy change, 
thereby increasing the rate of reform adoption, and that technological change enables reform. We 
also find some evidence of interest group pressures driving reform adoption, particularly 
privatization, as well as evidence that budgetary slack facilitates reform adoption, particularly in 
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the case of liberalization. Finally, we find evidence that checks and balances promote rather than 
limit market-oriented reforms in the case of minority privatization and, in the case of 
telecommunications, liberalization. In no case, however, do we observe checks and balances to 
impede the adoption of market-oriented reforms.  
Even after taking these domestic demand and supply factors into account, international 
coercion and emulation have a strong effect on domestic policy outcomes. Our results thus stand 
in contrast to prior work that questions the effect of capital market integration on policy 
convergence in industrialized countries, as well as a growing body of research that questions 
whether multilateral lending packages actually influence subsequent domestic policy outcomes 
(Bird 1996; Bird and Rowlands 2003; Killick 1998; Krueger 1998; Przeworski and Vreeland 
2000; Stone 2002; Ul Haque and Khan 1998). 
Future studies of the adoption of reform should include both the institutional forces 
emphasized by neo-institutional sociology, and the economic and political forces highlighted by 
scholars in positive political economy. These perspectives must be joined in order to generate a 
more complete depiction of the reform process, one that includes a prominent role for 
institutions, whether they are international or domestic in origin. Attempting to identify the 
determinants of infrastructure reform without acknowledging the importance of the forceful 
espousal of the practice by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, or the introduction 
of the idea of private provision by Chile, ignores the leverage foreign direct investors and 
multilateral lenders possess as well as the power of ideas. Similarly, an assessment of policy 
reforms in countries subject to similar levels of international coercion and emulation must take 
into account differences in domestic economic and political factors in order to produce 
meaningful conclusions.  
 43
Our results also suggest that the growing integration of the global economy is exerting a 
stronger influence on some domestic policymakers over time. Specifically, the growing scope of 
conditionality of multilateral lending causes a given level of dependence on lending institutions 
to influence reform adoption today much more than it did ten or twenty years ago. This finding is 
likely to concern critics of conditionality and globalization more generally, who oppose such 
influence either on moral grounds or because they believe that externally-driven policy decisions 
reduce national welfare in the long run.  
In this paper, we do not take a stance in the normative debate and emphasize that our 
empirical analysis makes no attempt to assess the welfare effects of the coercive influence that 
we identify. However, we are pursuing this topic in related research by assessing whether the 
sources of infrastructure policy reform—both domestic and international—affect the impact of 
reforms on supply, productivity, quality and service price. Given the growing body of empirical 
findings suggesting that de jure and de facto deregulation, privatization and liberalization are 
together required for successful transformation of state-owned enterprises in infrastructure 
services, our disaggregated analyses point to an important subsequent line of inquiry. 
Specifically, if multilateral lending does not influence each of these reforms equally, are the 
outcomes of market-oriented reforms (such as improved efficiency, output, contractual security 
and  market structure) better or worse in countries that reform as a result of direct or indirect 
coercion by multilateral lenders?  
This is a tantalizing debate which neo-institutional sociology can illuminate. A country 
pressured into deregulating, privatizing or liberalizing when sectoral performance does not create 
domestic demands for such a reform, or when the national policymaking apparatus lacks 
sufficient checks and balances to support a well-organized market, might fare much worse than a 
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country adopting such a reform as the result of clear performance shortfalls and in the presence 
of domestic institutional support. At the extreme, the normative policymaking prescription that 
the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and some academics espouse, rooted in the 
presumed wholesale efficacy of deregulation, privatization and liberalization, could be damaging 
for some countries, especially late adopters acting primarily as the result of coercion. In this case, 
institutional pressures may generate inferior policy choices and undermine internal support for 
market-oriented reforms. Understanding the drivers of adoption, as we do in this paper, is the 
first stage in a research program attempting to address the larger question of the extent to which 
pressures towards market-oriented reform result in ideal outcomes. Hence, neo-institutional 
sociology makes a contribution to the policy debate by unmasking the processes of cross-
national coercion and emulation, and by empirically showing how much they contribute to policy 
diffusion above and beyond the effect of domestic supply and demand factors. 
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Table 1: Timing of Reforms
left-censored 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 right-censored
Telecommunications
Regulator independent from Ministry 3 1 3 12 91 95
Regulator independent from incumbent 4 3 3 19 114 62
Regulator semi-autonomous 2 0 0 2 59 142
Regulator autonomous 2 0 2 2 62 137
Minority of sector privatized 0 1 1 7 47 149
Majority of sector privatized 0 1 0 2 23 179
Fully private 6 0 0 5 21 173
Competition in long distance 0 0 0 5 42 158
Competition in local service 0 0 0 2 45 158
Electricity
Regulator independent from Ministry 2 1 1 3 46 152
Regulator independent from incumbent 4 1 1 5 59 135
Regulator semi-autonomous 2 1 1 3 48 150
Regulator autonomous 1 0 1 2 15 186
Minority of sector privatized 2 0 0 1 13 189
Majority of sector privatized 1 0 0 1 16 187
Fully private 6 0 0 1 4 194
Competition in autogeneration 93 13 22 9 6 62
Competition in generation for resale 43 1 1 1 43 116  
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Table 2: Heterogeneity in Early and Comprehensive Reformers
Early Reformers
Telecommunications Electricity
Chile (1977) Chile (1978)
Philippines (1979) New Zealand (1986)
Hong Kong (1981) South Africa (1987)
United Kingdom (1984) Spain (1988)
Uruguay (1984) United Kingdom (1990)
Japan (1985) Norway (1991)
Spain (1987) Honduras (1991)
Equatorial Guinea (1987) Argentina (1991)
Haiti (1987) Peru (1992)
Norway (1987) Grenada (1992)
Belize (1988) Belize (1992)
Mauritius (1988) Venezuela (1992)
Finland (1988) Nepal (1992)
Maldives (1988) Colombia (1992)
Jamaica (1989) Hungary (1994)
Speed of Adoption of Comprehensive Reforms*
Telecommunications Electricity
United Kingdom (1984) Chile (1986)
Sweden (1993) United Kingdom (1991)
Canada (1994) Barbados (1991)
Finland (1994) Argentina (1993)
Hong Kong (1995) Peru (1995)
Philippines (1995) Australia (1996)
El Salvador (1996) Bolivia (1996)
Denmark (1997) Colombia (1997)
Ghana (1997) Trinidad & Tobago (1997)
Australia (1997) Spain (1998)
India (1997) Portugal (1998)
Netherlands (1997) Panama (1998)
France (1998) Netherlands (1999)
Austria (1998) Dominican Republic (1999)
Belgium (1998) Italy (1999)
* Deregulation, Privatization and Liberalization
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Table 3: Summary Statistics and Correlation Matrix
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Telecommunications Regulator independent from Ministry (1) 8200 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00
Telecommunications Regulator independent from incumbent (2) 8200 0.13 0.33 0.00 1.00 0.85
Telecommunications Regulator semi-autonomous (3) 8200 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00 0.41 0.35
Telecommunications Regulator autonomous (4) 8200 0.06 0.23 0.00 1.00 0.59 0.50 0.68
Telecommunications Minority of sector privatized (5) 8200 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 0.20 0.41 0.08 0.12
Telecommunications Majority of sector privatized (6) 8200 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 0.11 0.15 0.10 0.15 -0.04
Telecommunications Fully private (7) 8200 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00 0.40 0.47 0.05 0.27 -0.11 -0.04
Telecommunications Competition in long distance (8) 8200 0.03 0.18 0.00 1.00 0.12 0.16 0.12 0.09 -0.03 -0.03 0.27
Telecommunications Competition in local service (9) 8200 0.03 0.18 0.00 1.00 0.23 0.23 0.11 0.09 0.20 -0.03 0.16 0.61
Electricity Regulator independent from Ministry (10) 7840 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00 0.61 0.56 0.38 0.56 0.24 0.21 0.56 0.21 0.21
Electricity Regulator independent from incumbent (11) 7840 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00 0.59 0.55 0.36 0.51 0.30 0.23 0.49 0.28 0.31 0.90
Electricity Regulator semi-autonomous (12) 7840 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00 0.61 0.56 0.38 0.56 0.24 0.21 0.56 0.21 0.21 1.00 0.90
Electricity Regulator autonomous (13) 7840 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00 0.44 0.38 0.27 0.31 0.14 -0.04 0.50 0.26 0.18 0.67 0.60 0.67
Electricity Minority of sector privatized (14) 7840 0.03 0.18 0.00 1.00 0.08 0.21 0.10 0.04 0.34 0.15 -0.04 0.11 0.35 0.06 0.23 0.06 -0.03
Electricity Majority of sector privatized (15) 7840 0.01 0.11 0.00 1.00 0.26 0.22 0.18 0.35 0.03 0.18 0.33 0.00 -0.04 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.19
Electricity Fully private (16) 7840 0.01 0.11 0.00 1.00 0.22 0.21 -0.04 -0.06 0.04 -0.02 0.36 0.26 0.30 0.32 0.31 0.32 0.48
Electricity Competition in autogeneration (17) 7879 0.62 0.48 0.00 1.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.05 0.02 -0.09 0.11 0.08 0.04 0.02 -0.04 0.02 0.07
Electricity Competition in generation for resale (18) 7880 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 0.30 0.39 0.08 0.27 0.24 0.09 0.38 0.23 0.23 0.40 0.44 0.40 0.31
Ratio of Multilateral Lending to GDP (19) 3329 0.12 0.15 -0.02 1.58 -0.07 -0.14 -0.03 -0.06 -0.09 -0.03 -0.11 -0.14 -0.13 -0.13 -0.15 -0.13 -0.04
Trade Weighted Telecommunications Reform by Other Countries (20) 3741 0.20 0.23 0.00 0.99 0.26 0.34 0.20 0.22 0.13 0.10 0.24 0.22 0.16 0.28 0.29 0.28 0.19
Trade Weighted Electricity Reform by Other Countries (21) 3741 0.25 0.20 0.00 0.98 0.13 0.15 0.10 0.12 0.04 0.07 0.13 0.08 0.05 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.10
Waiting List for Telecommunications Services / Customers with Service (22) 3136 0.31 0.46 0.00 6.25 -0.09 -0.19 -0.13 -0.07 -0.12 -0.05 -0.11 -0.11 -0.12 -0.13 -0.15 -0.13 -0.02
Electricity power and distribution losses / electricity output (log) (23) 3574 2.42 0.56 0.16 5.47 0.12 0.12 0.20 0.22 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.23 0.20 0.23 0.12
Value Added by Industry (24) 4908 29.45 12.93 2.05 90.48 0.07 0.09 -0.15 -0.01 0.15 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.01
Population urban, percentage (25) 8200 42.90 25.02 0.00 100.00 0.33 0.40 0.07 0.19 0.18 0.10 0.36 0.01 0.11 0.37 0.35 0.37 0.24
Ratio of Foreign Direct Investment to GDP (26) 4216 1.76 4.19 -25.78 145.13 0.22 0.31 0.16 0.10 0.24 0.23 0.21 0.14 0.26 0.31 0.39 0.31 0.14
Political Constraints (27) 5288 0.26 0.33 0.00 0.89 0.21 0.32 0.08 0.09 0.21 0.07 0.17 0.26 0.24 0.21 0.24 0.21 0.05
Budget Balance to GDP (28) 2975 -3.43 6.07 -64.49 58.71 0.23 0.27 0.05 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.22 0.17 0.12 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.17
Population (log) (29) 7890 15.23 1.96 10.61 20.95 -0.04 0.02 0.05 0.17 0.03 -0.07 0.15 0.28 0.18 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.12
Real per capita GDP (log) (30) 5833 7.48 1.52 4.34 10.87 0.26 0.32 -0.01 0.08 0.10 0.05 0.28 0.07 0.05 0.21 0.23 0.21 0.08
Government reserves, ratio of imports (31) 5362 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.26 0.19 0.06 0.17 0.05 0.02 0.18 0.11 0.10 0.22 0.20 0.22 0.16
Debt service, ratio of exports (32) 3004 19.67 17.16 0.00 225.19 0.04 -0.03 -0.03 0.06 -0.06 -0.07 0.12 -0.07 -0.09 0.08 0.01 0.08 0.11
Openness, Portfolio Investment (exports + imports)/GDP (33) 3345 0.00 0.03 -0.29 0.45 0.13 0.13 0.05 0.14 0.05 0.03 0.14 0.05 0.04 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.00
Countries currently under a multilateral loan agreement (34) 7995 0.31 0.28 0.00 0.70 0.35 0.46 0.29 0.25 0.21 0.13 0.26 0.25 0.24 0.35 0.41 0.35 0.16
Predicted Probability of Increasing Multilateral Loan Exposure (35) 1221 0.53 0.15 0.04 0.93 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.02 0.05 0.03 -0.03 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.01
Polity (36) 5086 -0.10 7.75 -10.00 10.00 -0.32 -0.41 -0.10 -0.20 -0.18 -0.09 -0.31 -0.28 -0.24 -0.30 -0.35 -0.30 -0.13
Duration of Political Regime (37) 5424 21.60 23.90 0.00 99.00 0.29 0.34 0.10 0.13 0.12 0.06 0.21 0.17 0.17 0.24 0.27 0.24 0.08
Changes in Effective Executive (38) 5491 0.17 0.43 0.00 4.00 0.14 0.08 0.06 0.00 -0.08 0.01 -0.17 0.01 0.05 -0.09 -0.12 -0.09 -0.12
Openness, Trade (exports + imports)/GDP (39) 5637 21.60 23.92 1.13 439.03 0.04 0.12 -0.01 -0.14 0.19 0.11 -0.13 0.00 0.03 -0.11 -0.02 -0.11 -0.11
Debt service, ratio of GDP (40) 3294 4.92 5.09 0.00 107.36 0.07 0.01 -0.07 -0.09 0.00 0.03 0.02 -0.06 -0.09 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.04
Government spending, ratio of GDP (41) 3106 28.28 14.85 0.00 212.09 -0.13 -0.16 -0.09 -0.27 0.03 0.02 -0.16 -0.22 -0.08 -0.12 -0.11 -0.12 -0.16
Government revenue, ratio of GDP (42) 3121 24.16 12.77 0.00 179.80 -0.04 -0.05 -0.11 -0.26 0.11 0.04 -0.10 -0.17 -0.03 -0.07 -0.06 -0.07 -0.11
Government subsidies and transfers, ratio of GDP (43) 2768 0.09 0.09 0.00 1.91 0.17 0.20 -0.02 -0.09 0.23 0.06 0.09 -0.06 0.17 0.20 0.24 0.20 0.02
Government consumption, ratio of GDP (44) 5537 15.81 6.96 1.38 76.22 -0.19 -0.21 0.06 -0.15 -0.02 0.06 -0.27 -0.16 -0.03 -0.14 -0.11 -0.14 -0.21
Population growth (45) 8200 1.88 1.63 -44.40 18.02 -0.20 -0.28 -0.03 0.01 -0.16 -0.12 -0.15 -0.07 -0.11 -0.19 -0.27 -0.19 -0.01
Real per capita GDP growth (46) 5840 1.65 6.39 -52.10 79.71 0.08 0.10 0.00 -0.05 0.06 -0.01 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08  
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Table 3: Summary Statistics and Correlation Matrix (continued)
Variable (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27)
Electricity Majority of sector privatized (15) -0.04
Electricity Fully private (16) -0.03 -0.03
Electricity Competition in autogeneration (17) -0.12 0.05 0.00
Electricity Competition in generation for resale (18) 0.22 0.18 0.17 0.19
Ratio of Multilateral Lending to GDP (19) -0.15 -0.04 -0.04 0.02 -0.31
Trade Weighted Telecommunications Reform by Other Countries (20) 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.29 -0.08
Trade Weighted Electricity Reform by Other Countries (21) 0.02 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.16 -0.04
Waiting List for Telecommunications Services / Customers with Service (22) -0.13 -0.11 -0.07 0.09 -0.18 0.11 -0.26 -0.38
Electricity power and distribution losses / electricity output (log) (23) -0.03 0.13 -0.04 -0.11 0.24 0.17 0.07 0.07 0.07
Value Added by Industry (24) 0.14 -0.05 0.10 0.07 0.34 -0.45 0.04 0.06 0.00 -0.02 -0.14
Population urban, percentage (25) 0.14 0.22 0.22 -0.17 0.38 -0.41 0.24 0.34 0.16 -0.30 0.11
Ratio of Foreign Direct Investment to GDP (26) 0.32 0.12 0.17 -0.08 0.22 -0.20 0.19 0.28 0.09 -0.19 0.11 0.14
Political Constraints (27) 0.17 0.07 0.08 0.03 0.24 -0.34 0.26 0.37 0.15 -0.32 0.04 0.29 0.30
Budget Balance to GDP (28) 0.12 0.11 0.16 0.03 0.19 -0.27 0.20 0.29 0.11 -0.16 -0.10 0.34 0.11 0.15
Population (log) (29) -0.03 0.05 0.00 0.29 0.33 -0.11 0.09 0.13 0.02 0.01 0.03 -0.04 -0.19 0.05
Real per capita GDP (log) (30) 0.14 0.16 0.13 -0.03 0.34 -0.61 0.20 0.30 0.12 -0.29 -0.08 0.78 0.20 0.42
Government reserves, ratio of imports (31) 0.00 0.20 0.20 -0.09 0.28 -0.27 0.14 0.20 0.10 -0.13 0.10 0.48 0.06 0.25
Debt service, ratio of exports (32) -0.16 0.14 -0.01 0.07 0.05 0.24 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.02 0.10 0.10 -0.21 -0.12
Openness, Portfolio Investment (exports + imports)/GDP (33) 0.00 0.11 0.01 -0.02 0.08 -0.06 0.05 0.07 0.03 -0.06 0.02 0.13 0.00 0.14
Countries currently under a multilateral loan agreement (34) 0.20 0.14 0.09 -0.11 0.18 -0.02 0.39 0.56 0.10 -0.39 0.15 0.29 0.28 0.34
Predicted Probability of Increasing Multilateral Loan Exposure (35) 0.00 -0.07 -0.01 -0.04 0.04 -0.09 0.07 0.10 0.03 -0.01 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.19
Polity (36) -0.20 -0.18 -0.18 0.03 -0.40 0.61 -0.32 -0.47 -0.17 0.36 0.02 -0.66 -0.27 -0.65
Duration of Political Regime (37) 0.14 0.01 0.09 -0.08 0.19 -0.27 0.29 0.42 0.19 -0.23 0.23 0.33 0.20 0.70
Changes in Effective Executive (38) 0.01 -0.04 -0.10 0.11 -0.05 0.10 0.09 0.13 0.02 0.01 0.03 -0.20 0.01 0.03
Openness, Trade (exports + imports)/GDP (39) 0.30 -0.14 -0.03 -0.08 -0.10 0.00 0.01 0.02 -0.04 -0.05 -0.08 -0.08 0.38 0.11
Debt service, ratio of GDP (40) -0.06 0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.29 -0.02 -0.03 0.00 -0.07 0.02 0.01 0.04 -0.08
Government spending, ratio of GDP (41) 0.00 -0.12 -0.09 -0.05 -0.14 0.08 -0.20 -0.28 -0.13 0.17 0.06 -0.08 0.12 -0.09
Government revenue, ratio of GDP (42) 0.06 -0.10 -0.03 -0.08 -0.03 -0.10 -0.14 -0.20 -0.09 0.10 0.00 0.12 0.20 -0.01
Government subsidies and transfers, ratio of GDP (43) 0.15 0.05 0.09 -0.17 0.11 -0.27 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.12 0.08 0.43 0.18 0.23
Government consumption, ratio of GDP (44) 0.12 -0.05 -0.13 -0.14 -0.23 0.07 -0.15 -0.22 -0.11 0.04 0.05 -0.17 0.12 -0.10
Population growth (45) -0.13 -0.06 -0.06 0.19 -0.09 0.25 -0.14 -0.20 -0.06 0.17 -0.09 -0.31 -0.22 -0.33
Real per capita GDP growth (46) 0.05 -0.01 0.10 0.01 0.06 -0.13 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.10 0.13
(28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36) (37) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42) (43) (44) (45)
Population (log) (29) 0.06
Real per capita GDP (log) (30) 0.37 -0.18
Government reserves, ratio of imports (31) 0.30 0.10 0.35
Debt service, ratio of exports (32) 0.00 0.29 -0.14 0.15
Openness, Portfolio Investment (exports + imports)/GDP (33) 0.05 0.06 0.12 0.14 0.00
Countries currently under a multilateral loan agreement (34) 0.22 0.07 0.19 0.05 -0.03 0.08
Predicted Probability of Increasing Multilateral Loan Exposure (35) -0.01 0.11 0.05 0.02 -0.01 0.04 0.07
Polity (36) -0.46 -0.05 -0.78 -0.54 0.22 -0.16 -0.39 -0.10
Duration of Political Regime (37) 0.22 -0.06 0.40 0.26 -0.12 0.12 0.33 0.26 -0.56
Changes in Effective Executive (38) -0.06 -0.06 -0.10 0.04 -0.01 -0.08 0.06 -0.01 0.03 0.00
Openness, Trade (exports + imports)/GDP (39) 0.01 -0.59 0.17 -0.27 -0.45 -0.06 0.15 -0.08 -0.09 0.07 0.03
Debt service, ratio of GDP (40) -0.15 -0.16 -0.02 -0.03 0.31 -0.06 0.04 -0.02 0.15 -0.13 0.01 0.27
Government spending, ratio of GDP (41) -0.36 -0.41 -0.01 -0.20 -0.12 -0.03 -0.02 -0.07 0.19 -0.25 0.04 0.36 0.26
Government revenue, ratio of GDP (42) -0.05 -0.41 0.23 -0.09 -0.19 -0.01 0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.17 0.00 0.43 0.24 0.86
Government subsidies and transfers, ratio of GDP (43) 0.15 -0.10 0.40 0.09 -0.06 0.08 0.26 0.07 -0.33 0.21 -0.12 0.09 0.10 0.48 0.64
Government consumption, ratio of GDP (44) -0.29 -0.47 -0.11 -0.28 -0.19 -0.04 -0.06 -0.05 0.24 -0.27 -0.03 0.38 0.14 0.60 0.47 0.06
Population growth (45) -0.21 0.01 -0.38 -0.04 0.15 -0.06 -0.39 -0.08 0.40 -0.36 0.15 -0.10 0.10 -0.11 -0.26 -0.60 0.19
Real per capita GDP growth (46) 0.22 0.05 0.16 0.11 -0.16 0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.18 0.10 0.02 0.12 -0.13 -0.11 0.02 0.08 -0.15 -0.19
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Table 4: Base Regression Results
-First Stage- ------------Telecom------------- --------Electricity---------
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Reserves (as a ratio of imports) -46.816 Ratio of Multilateral Lending to GDP 2.730 0.391 1.117 -1.114
0.001   (H1a > 0) 0.041 0.860 0.230 0.557
Budget Balance (as a ratio of GDP) -0.016 Trade Weighted Reform by Other Countries 1.384 1.412 1.324 1.330
0.049   (H2 > 0) 0.001 0.001 0.012 0.010
Debt Service (as a ratio of exports) 0.007 Sectoral Performance Shortfall 0.406 0.400 0.301 0.304
0.025 0.021 0.028 0.008 0.006
Ratio of Foreign Direct Investment to GDP 0.000 Value Added by Industry 0.005 0.000 0.007 0.006
0.990 0.966 0.980 0.328 0.363
Ratio of Portfolio Investment to GDP 0.630 Urban population share 0.011 0.012 0.003 0.004
0.579 0.193 0.179 0.669 0.646
Count of other countries receiving loan -0.393 Ratio of Foreign Direct Investment to GDP 0.046 0.045 0.029 0.029
0.179 0.094 0.104 0.185 0.188
New Government? 0.169 Political Constraints 0.354 0.360 0.096 0.092
0.027 0.336 0.334 0.616 0.630
Political Constraints -0.348 Budget Balance (as a ratio of GDP) 0.045 0.044 0.010 0.010
0.026 0.033 0.037 0.374 0.404
Log of Population -0.051 Log of Population 0.137 0.135 0.118 0.118
0.060 0.088 0.099 0.015 0.015
Log of Real Per Capita Income -0.178 Log of Real Per Capita Income 0.099 0.081 0.115 0.114
0.000 0.632 0.700 0.393 0.398
Constant 2.320 Predicted Probability of Increasing -0.676 -0.561 0.078 0.171
0.000   Multilateral Exposure, From (1) 0.484 0.573 0.892 0.760
Constant -8.110 -7.979 -14.834 -14.987
N 11475 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000
Pseudo Log-Likelihood -7417.5 Time Varying Coefficient Estimates
Constant 0.541 0.523 1.296 1.294
0.108 0.121 0.000 0.000
Ratio of Multilateral Lending to GDP 0.510 0.341
  (H1a > 0; H1b > 0) 0.003 0.030
N 5319 5319 5508 5508
Pseudo Log-Likelihood 433.7 447.0 1277.8 1297.4
* p-values are reported in italics underneath coefficient estimates.
**  Strata specific constants and time paramaters are suppressed
Note: Dependent Variable in First Stage Regression (1) is a 0/1 indicator variable that takes the value of 1 when a country increases its exposure to multilateral institutions.
         Dependent Variable in Remaining Equations is a 0/1 indicator variable that takes the value of 1 when a country initiates a given reform in a given year.
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Table 5: Robustness to Inclusion of Additional Independent Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Telecommunications, Effect of Multilateral Lending Constant Across Time
Ratio of Multilateral Lending to GDP 2.654 2.857 2.740 3.190 2.745 3.012 2.509 2.617 2.402 2.391 2.574 2.821
  (H1 > 0) 0.032 0.035 0.039 0.073 0.041 0.025 0.071 0.057 0.076 0.076 0.060 0.038
Trade Weighted Reform by Other Countries 1.220 1.328 1.394 0.990 1.394 1.345 1.371 1.380 1.150 1.169 1.362 1.462
  (H2 > 0) 0.004 0.003 0.001 0.010 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.008 0.007 0.001 0.000
Rotated Variable (See Note) 0.416 0.004 0.069 0.066 0.003 1.282 0.011 0.002 -0.028 -0.025 0.051 0.023
0.020 0.433 0.469 0.719 0.262 0.168 0.624 0.725 0.054 0.079 0.466 0.306
N 5319 5211 5319 3222 5310 5175 5319 5310 5193 5184 5319 5319
Telecommunications, Effect of Multilateral Lending Varying Across Time
Ratio of Multilateral Lending to GDP 0.077 0.409 0.437 2.660 0.482 0.900 0.034 0.138 -0.114 -0.103 0.209 0.479
  (H1a > 0) 0.974 0.853 0.842 0.467 0.828 0.671 0.988 0.952 0.962 0.966 0.927 0.827
Trade Weighted Reform by Other Countries 1.260 1.359 1.426 1.044 1.425 1.370 1.400 1.411 1.188 1.207 1.394 1.494
  (H2 > 0) 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.007 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.004 0.001 0.000
Rotated Variable (See Note) 0.042 0.004 0.073 0.061 0.003 1.222 0.014 0.002 -0.028 -0.025 0.050 0.023
0.018 0.427 0.471 0.737 0.268 0.191 0.544 0.626 0.055 0.078 0.474 0.309
Time Varying Coefficient Estimate
Ratio of Multilateral Lending to GDP 0.564 0.523 0.505 0.322 0.513 0.482 0.523 0.518 0.523 0.526 0.507 0.513
  (H1a > 0; H1b > 0) 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.392 0.003 0.001 0.004 0.003 0.010 0.008 0.003 0.003
N 5319 5211 5319 3222 5310 5175 5319 5310 5193 5184 5319 5319
Electricity, Effect of Multilateral Lending Constant Across Time
Ratio of Multilateral Lending to GDP 0.803 0.860 0.882 1.841 0.911 1.030 0.677 0.727 0.915 0.949 0.742 0.893
  (H1a > 0) 0.370 0.335 0.334 0.080 0.311 0.255 0.474 0.432 0.346 0.324 0.402 0.326
Trade Weighted Reform by Other Countries 1.371 1.516 1.430 0.985 1.420 1.441 1.414 1.416 1.343 1.349 1.296 1.456
  (H2 > 0) 0.006 0.003 0.005 0.253 0.006 0.004 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.012 0.004
Rotated Variable (See Note) 0.009 -0.004 -0.029 0.056 -0.001 -0.349 0.007 0.002 -0.009 -0.010 0.102 0.100
0.438 0.354 0.519 0.681 0.788 0.503 0.649 0.247 0.261 0.278 0.048 0.475
N 5616 5706 5706 3483 5697 5535 5706 5697 5580 5562 5706 5706
Electricity, Effect of Multilateral Lending Varying Across Time
Ratio of Multilateral Lending to GDP -2.158 -1.828 -1.919 -2.838 -1.855 -1.995 -2.260 -2.054 -1.673 -1.514 -1.476 -1.989
  (H1 > 0) 0.255 0.340 0.31 0.240 0.313 0.290 0.182 0.288 0.427 0.473 0.412 0.290
Trade Weighted Reform by Other Countries 1.372 1.509 1.432 0.720 1.421 1.443 1.413 1.417 1.344 1.349 1.302 1.457
  (H2 > 0) 0.005 0.002 0.004 0.218 0.005 0.003 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.009 0.003
Rotated Variable (See Note) 0.010 -0.004 -0.029 0.065 -0.001 -0.365 0.008 0.003 -0.009 -0.010 0.100 0.098
0.404 0.395 0.522 0.637 0.776 0.478 0.566 0.222 0.238 0.258 0.048 0.483
Time Varying Coefficient Estimate
Ratio of Multilateral Lending to GDP 0.420 0.398 0.408 0.624 0.402 0.462 0.418 0.403 0.375 0.365 0.338 0.414
  (H1a > 0; H1b > 0) 0.023 0.034 0.03 0.082 0.033 0.014 0.027 0.030 0.048 0.052 0.061 0.031
N 5616 5706 5706 3483 5697 5535 5706 5697 5580 5562 5706 5706
* p-values are reported in italics underneath coefficient estimates.
**  Coefficient estimates other than those of theoretical interest, strata specific constants and time paramaters are all suppressed
Rotated Variable
  (1) Level of Democratization, Polity
  (2) Durability of Political Regime, Years since regime change
  (3) Durability of Political Leadership, Years of change in leadership
  (4) Ideology of Political Leadership, Right of Center Government
  (5) Openness of Host country economy, (exports + imports)/GDP
  (6) Openness of Host country economy, portfolio investment/GDP
  (7) Debt burden, debt service/GDP
  (8) Debt buden, debt service/exports
  (9) Size of government (expenditure), Share of GDP
  (10) Size of government (revenue), Government Share of GDP
  (11) Population growth
  (12) Real per capita income growth
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Table 6: Robustness of Results to Varying Base Year for Hazard Analysis
---------------------------------Telecommunications--------------------------------- ----------------------------------------Electricity--------------------------------------
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Ratio of Multilateral Lending to GDP 2.861 1.193 3.058 1.096 3.489 2.009 0.943 -0.921 1.132 -0.961 1.786 0.871
  (H1a > 0) 0.031 0.556 0.024 0.598 0.009 0.342 0.283 0.607 0.224 0.587 0.094 0.581
Trade Weighted Reform by Other Countries 1.177 1.210 1.256 1.292 1.192 1.237 1.281 1.270 1.323 1.328 1.340 1.341
  (H2 > 0) 0.006 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.015 0.013 0.012 0.010 0.012 0.011
Sectoral Performance Shortfall 0.386 0.383 0.434 0.428 0.491 0.482 0.288 0.292 0.305 0.309 0.290 0.296
0.034 0.042 0.019 0.024 0.018 0.023 0.009 0.007 0.008 0.006 0.017 0.014
Value Added by Industry 0.007 0.006 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.004 0.004
0.600 0.620 0.788 0.805 0.856 0.865 0.268 0.303 0.340 0.374 0.568 0.600
Urban population share 0.011 0.012 0.010 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003
0.193 0.179 0.193 0.177 0.200 0.182 0.603 0.571 0.669 0.647 0.683 0.658
Ratio of Foreign Direct Investment to GDP 0.031 0.031 0.041 0.041 0.043 0.042 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.031 0.031
0.255 0.269 0.140 0.151 0.131 0.142 0.196 0.201 0.183 0.184 0.161 0.155
Political Constraints 0.317 0.325 0.324 0.332 0.430 0.437 0.135 0.129 0.094 0.089 0.093 0.087
0.372 0.368 0.362 0.358 0.227 0.226 0.464 0.484 0.628 0.643 0.656 0.677
Budget Balance (as a ratio of GDP) 0.052 0.051 0.042 0.041 0.038 0.037 0.012 0.012 0.010 0.010 0.011 0.011
0.012 0.014 0.031 0.036 0.039 0.045 0.255 0.266 0.371 0.400 0.391 0.383
Log of Population 0.138 0.136 0.141 0.138 0.137 0.134 0.111 0.111 0.118 0.119 0.129 0.129
0.078 0.086 0.073 0.082 0.076 0.087 0.019 0.018 0.016 0.015 0.013 0.013
Log of Real Per Capita Income 0.127 0.108 0.147 0.128 0.195 0.176 0.088 0.084 0.117 0.116 0.146 0.143
0.538 0.605 0.458 0.522 0.323 0.381 0.492 0.512 0.391 0.394 0.300 0.311
Predicted Probability of Increasing -0.080 0.008 -0.589 0.332 -0.518 -0.410 0.169 0.253 0.076 0.165 -0.110 -0.072
  Multilateral Exposure, From (1), Table 4 0.938 0.994 0.545 0.358 0.627 0.709 0.758 0.636 0.897 0.773 0.886 0.925
Constant -16.950 -17.006 -9.310 -0.487 -8.651 -8.507 -29.505 -30.122 -13.975 -14.107 -10.781 -10.834
0.003 0.003 0.000 0.628 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Time Varying Coefficient Estimates
Constant 1.313 1.319 0.686 0.670 0.570 0.544 1.960 1.981 1.229 1.226 0.916 0.905
0.001 0.001 0.043 0.051 0.012 0.018 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
Ratio of Multilateral Lending to GDP 0.169 0.424 0.455 0.137 0.354 0.337
  (H1a > 0; H1b > 0) 0.004 0.005 0.061 0.029 0.034 0.137
N 5418 5418 5031 5031 4239 4239 6084 6084 5391 5391 4419 4419
Pseudo Log-Likelihood 935.60 948.46 384.85 397.77 177.32 190.92 2662.08 2683.52 1164.18 1183.30 592.74 607.78
* p-values are reported in italics underneath coefficient estimates.
**  Strata specific constants and time paramaters are suppressed
*** Initial year for analysis set to 1960 in columns 1-2, 1979 for columsn 3-4, 1986 for columns 5-6, 1960 for columns 7-8, 1978 for columns 9-10 and 1987 for columns 11-12.
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Table 7: Robustness of Results to Allowing Effect of Other Variables to Vary Across Time
---------------------------------Telecommunications--------------------------------- ----------------------------------------Electricity--------------------------------------
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Ratio of Multilateral Lending to GDP 2.747 2.800 -0.459 0.446 2.832 -0.130 0.941 0.955 -2.672 -2.017 0.998 -2.528
  (H1a > 0) 0.040 0.039 0.856 0.840 0.037 0.956 0.306 0.285 0.235 0.012 0.265 0.232
Trade Weighted Reform by Other Countries -0.988 1.408 -1.326 1.430 -1.596 -1.733 -1.314 1.234 -1.053 1.249 -1.164 0.898
  (H2 > 0) 0.628 0.001 0.539 0.001 0.443 0.406 0.431 0.015 0.534 0.012 0.506 0.617
Sectoral Performance Shortfall 0.399 0.105 0.386 0.110 -0.254 -0.226 0.293 0.447 0.298 0.496 0.562 0.570
0.024 0.785 0.036 0.779 0.532 0.558 0.011 0.185 0.008 0.162 0.129 0.129
Value Added by Industry 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.008 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.008 0.007
0.917 0.936 0.913 0.952 0.901 0.919 0.241 0.345 0.278 0.359 0.247 0.264
Urban population share 0.012 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.011 0.012 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003
0.181 0.197 0.172 0.181 0.190 0.176 0.675 0.654 0.657 0.641 0.685 0.671
Ratio of Foreign Direct Investment to GDP 0.040 0.045 0.039 0.045 0.041 0.041 0.034 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.035 0.034
0.150 0.099 0.162 0.111 0.145 0.155 0.142 0.140 0.152 0.142 0.124 0.132
Political Constraints 0.403 0.356 0.408 0.358 0.412 0.413 0.124 0.098 0.111 0.091 0.108 0.101
0.278 0.336 0.276 0.338 0.269 0.272 0.506 0.584 0.547 0.609 0.550 0.577
Budget Balance (as a ratio of GDP) 0.046 0.044 0.045 0.044 0.046 0.046 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.011 0.011
0.030 0.037 0.030 0.039 0.031 0.030 0.335 0.317 0.386 0.365 0.305 0.354
Log of Population 0.130 0.135 0.127 0.134 0.132 0.131 0.116 0.124 0.115 0.123 0.126 0.124
0.118 0.099 0.129 0.105 0.122 0.128 0.018 0.011 0.018 0.011 0.011 0.012
Log of Real Per Capita Income 0.069 0.091 0.051 0.078 0.070 0.056 0.096 0.116 0.093 0.112 0.113 0.107
0.735 0.658 0.807 0.712 0.731 0.790 0.486 0.415 0.499 0.431 0.422 0.446
Predicted Probability of Increasing -0.797 -0.705 -0.676 -0.545 -0.804 -0.629 0.078 0.101 0.182 0.193 0.036 0.133
  Multilateral Exposure, From (1), Table 4 0.432 0.473 0.516 0.591 0.441 0.559 0.890 0.860 0.744 0.731 0.949 0.810
Constant -7.235 -7.888 -6.924 -7.819 -6.780 -6.628 -12.878 -14.434 -12.934 -14.503 -14.001 -13.904
0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003
Time Varying Coefficient Estimates
Constant 0.481 0.517 0.439 0.502 0.403 0.379 1.108 1.076 1.101 1.090 1.038 1.040
0.139 0.144 0.168 0.160 0.255 0.280 0.004 0.009 0.005 0.009 0.009 0.010
Ratio of Multilateral Lending to GDP 0.598 0.508 0.563 0.479 0.260 0.409
  (H1a > 0; H1b > 0) 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.004 0.048 0.014
Trade Weighted Reform by Other Countries 0.321 0.373 0.415 0.432 0.257 0.235 0.213 0.197
0.172 0.108 0.093 0.064 0.059 0.078 0.169 0.199
Sectoral Performance Shortfall 0.049 0.039 0.096 0.081 0.045 0.035 0.034 0.027
0.329 0.402 0.118 0.131 0.231 0.316 0.427 0.481
N 5319 5319 5319 5319 5319 5319 5706 5706 5706 5706 5706 5706
Pseudo Log-Likelihood 445.94 458.54 440.23 451.29 452.02 463.05 1338.22 1351.35 1358.1 1368.3 1358.15 1374.79
* p-values are reported in italics underneath coefficient estimates.
**  Strata specific constants and time paramaters are suppressed
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Table 8: Robustness of Results to Disaggregation of Dependent Variable, Telecommunications by Type of Reform
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Ratio of Multilateral Lending to GDP 2.698 -0.522 3.317 0.847 1.036 -6.024 5.454 0.456 -6.345 8.291
  (H1a > 0) 0.063 0.817 0.015 0.671 0.641 0.276 0.014 0.909 0.435 0.698
Trade Weighted Reform by Other Countries 1.194 1.200 1.028 1.023 1.593 1.633 2.071 2.071 0.844 0.838
  (H2 > 0) 0.019 0.015 0.020 0.019 0.125 0.100 0.016 0.016 0.547 0.548
Sectoral Performance Shortfall 0.434 0.419 0.562 0.556 -0.006 -0.055 0.569 0.571 0.713 0.703
0.012 0.015 0.000 0.000 0.988 0.884 0.223 0.215 0.330 0.346
Value Added by Industry -0.010 -0.010 -0.003 -0.003 -0.039 -0.038 0.026 0.026 0.004 0.004
0.511 0.524 0.820 0.821 0.262 0.280 0.058 0.055 0.902 0.917
Urban population share 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.014 0.015 0.035 0.035 0.005 0.005
0.276 0.272 0.331 0.334 0.317 0.281 0.015 0.014 0.673 0.671
Ratio of Foreign Direct Investment to GDP 0.233 0.021 0.038 0.038 -0.011 -0.016 0.108 0.105 0.157 0.158
0.483 0.522 0.223 0.228 0.861 0.798 0.013 0.015 0.103 0.108
Political Constraints 0.106 0.118 0.254 0.252 -0.486 -0.472 1.131 1.146 2.839 2.853
0.816 0.793 0.560 0.561 0.506 0.504 0.056 0.054 0.000 0.000
Budget Balance (as a ratio of GDP) 0.022 0.022 0.024 0.024 0.014 0.014 0.073 0.074 0.296 0.297
0.284 0.288 0.274 0.279 0.677 0.691 0.038 0.040 0.001 0.000
Log of Population 0.044 0.426 0.016 0.016 0.114 0.109 0.269 0.267 0.805 0.810
0.640 0.656 0.851 0.860 0.463 0.480 0.020 0.022 0.003 0.003
Log of Real Per Capita Income 0.120 0.123 0.296 0.299 -0.410 -0.417 0.380 0.376 -0.417 -0.422
0.603 0.598 0.201 0.200 0.311 0.295 0.285 0.289 0.510 0.509
Predicted Probability of Increasing -1.036 -0.888 -0.506 -0.461 -2.969 -2.647 2.883 2.986 -1.728 -1.682
  Multilateral Exposure, From (1), Table 4 0.351 0.428 0.586 0.619 0.201 0.262 0.066 0.053 0.575 0.583
Constant -6.542 -6.449 -8.123 -8.066 -3.776 -3.193 -25.073 -24.655 -39.886 -40.508
0.015 0.015 0.004 0.004 0.490 0.530 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.007
Time Varying Coefficient Estimates
Constant 0.626 0.600 0.653 0.635 1.669 1.691 1.492 1.484 2.064 2.078
0.059 0.059 0.055 0.061 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.049 0.000 0.000
Ratio of Multilateral Lending to GDP 0.506 0.456 0.160 0.211 -0.318
  (H1a > 0; H1b > 0) 0.004 0.006 0.629 0.552 0.747
N 2364 2364 1182 1182 1182 1182 1773 1773 1182 1182
Pseudo Log-Likelihood 407.16 411.27 375.22 376.00 46.90 49.13 35.80 36.24 70.41 70.52
* p-values are reported in italics underneath coefficient estimates.
**  Strata specific constants and time paramaters are suppressed
Dependent Variables
  (1)-(2) Measures of deregulation (Objective measures and subjective measures described below)
  (3)-(4) Objective measures of deregulation (Regulator independent of Ministry and Regulator independent of incumbent)
  (5)-(6) Subjective measures of deregulation (Regulator semiautonomous and Regulator autonomous)
  (7)-(8) Measures of privatization (minority privatization, majority privatization and full privatization)
  (9)-(10) Measures of competition (competition in long distance and local telephony)  
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Table 9: Robustness of Results to Disaggregation of Dependent Variable, Telecommunications by Individual Reform
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
Ratio of Multilateral Lending to GDP 4.220 1.866 2.485 -0.380 -3.880 -16.428 2.160 -1.893 0.687 -8.166 17.356 124.000 11.873 12.135 -2.468 0.999 -22.088 39.659
  (H1a > 0) 0.015 0.361 0.041 0.863 0.088 0.045 0.415 0.691 0.869 0.354 0.131 0.262 0.000 0.000 0.755 0.925 0.074 0.005
Trade Weighted Reform by Other Countries 1.083 1.084 0.989 0.986 0.458 0.512 2.000 1.995 2.585 2.491 -11.195 -13.371 1.305 1.300 3.158 3.085 -1.144 -1.209
  (H2 > 0) 0.032 0.031 0.029 0.027 0.580 0.535 0.111 0.108 0.043 0.055 0.582 0.531 0.180 0.182 0.037 0.042 0.510 0.491
Sectoral Performance Shortfall 0.386 0.380 0.655 0.659 -0.549 -0.570 0.253 0.236 -0.595 -0.553 1.909 2.423 1.531 1.545 1.010 1.055 0.142 0.140
0.166 0.173 0.000 0.000 0.197 0.180 0.495 0.530 0.432 0.446 0.429 0.369 0.002 0.002 0.253 0.237 0.874 0.878
Value Added by Industry -0.001 -0.001 -0.004 -0.004 -0.149 -0.147 -0.023 -0.023 0.080 0.079 0.201 0.253 0.000 0.000 -0.046 -0.045 0.055 0.058
0.951 0.957 0.711 0.718 0.000 0.000 0.498 0.505 0.000 0.000 0.291 0.319 0.991 0.990 0.166 0.168 0.236 0.215
Urban population share 0.010 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.013 -0.012 0.022 0.022 0.047 0.047 0.080 0.103 0.026 0.026 -0.010 -0.011 0.042 0.046
0.431 0.435 0.269 0.285 0.524 0.561 0.106 0.104 0.099 0.095 0.213 0.280 0.179 0.181 0.411 0.403 0.031 0.014
Ratio of Foreign Direct Investment to GDP 0.040 0.039 0.037 0.037 0.006 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.049 0.048 -0.057 -0.080 0.174 0.175 0.095 0.101 0.158 0.168
0.315 0.323 0.232 0.227 0.930 0.959 0.931 0.950 0.407 0.413 0.792 0.738 0.004 0.003 0.540 0.517 0.018 0.025
Political Constraints 0.068 0.068 0.387 0.392 -0.733 -0.716 -0.468 -0.483 2.577 2.558 1.986 3.015 -0.509 -0.510 2.490 2.513 4.112 4.443
0.891 0.890 0.337 0.328 0.377 0.389 0.487 0.470 0.018 0.020 0.667 0.598 0.629 0.629 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Budget Balance (as a ratio of GDP) 0.018 0.018 0.029 0.029 0.043 0.042 0.007 0.006 0.030 0.030 0.661 0.728 0.108 0.109 0.284 0.290 0.291 0.301
0.487 0.494 0.167 0.172 0.395 0.402 0.849 0.859 0.457 0.464 0.013 0.022 0.253 0.253 0.002 0.002 0.008 0.006
Log of Population -0.032 -0.033 0.048 0.052 -0.012 -0.020 0.197 0.192 -0.015 -0.020 -1.461 -1.763 0.581 0.587 0.924 0.953 0.642 0.678
0.776 0.769 0.533 0.500 0.926 0.874 0.294 0.307 0.934 0.909 0.358 0.417 0.013 0.013 0.004 0.004 0.025 0.027
Log of Real Per Capita Income 0.232 0.237 0.318 0.345 -0.303 -0.352 -0.375 -0.383 -1.070 -1.076 -1.399 -1.866 1.692 1.716 0.100 0.155 -1.838 -1.972
0.430 0.425 0.115 0.093 0.541 0.475 0.407 0.398 0.027 0.029 0.612 0.615 0.005 0.004 0.896 0.842 0.009 0.004
Predicted Probability of Increasing -1.533 -1.482 0.165 0.305 -2.331 -2.321 -3.408 -3.345 2.217 2.465 1.241 3.004 1.274 1.381 -5.633 -5.384 0.440 1.036
  Multilateral Exposure, From (1), Table 4 0.192 0.204 0.855 0.733 0.475 0.472 0.109 0.114 0.544 0.474 0.815 0.555 0.643 0.618 0.032 0.040 0.918 0.800
Constant -6.254 -6.151 -9.515 -9.717 -34.267 -32.022 -5.811 -5.469 -3.350 -3.021 -120.648 -154.030 -38.822 -39.326 -34.787 -36.500 -31.501 -35.126
0.062 0.064 0.001 0.001 0.010 0.013 0.304 0.329 0.562 0.605 0.244 0.177 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.010 0.069 0.054
Time Varying Coefficient Estimates
Constant 0.627 0.605 0.899 0.728 2.622 2.603 0.907 0.679 0.648 0.262 3.462 4.054 1.428 1.398 1.895 1.846 2.204 2.348
0.066 0.071 0.000 0.027 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.271 0.000 0.703 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Ratio of Multilateral Lending to GDP 0.374 0.413 0.286 0.568 1.494 -0.649 -0.012 -0.159 -2.323
  (H1a > 0; H1b > 0) 0.007 0.054 0.087 0.060 0.136 0.000 0.931 0.648 0.000
N 591 591 591 591 591 591 591 591 591 591 591 591 591 591 591 591 591 591
Pseudo Log-Likelihood 133.89 134.18 243.46 243.73 42.48 42.65 16.98 17.24 2.21 2.50 8.73 9.14 60.08 60.09 45.37 45.39 37.96 38.98
* p-values are reported in italics underneath coefficient estimates.
**  Strata specific constants and time paramaters are suppressed
Dependent Variables:
  (1)-(2) Regulator Independent from Ministry
  (3)-(4) Regulator Independent from Incumbent
  (5)-(6) Regulator Semi-Autonomous
  (7)-(8) Regulator Autonomous
  (9)-(10) Minority Privatization
  (11)-(12) Majority Privatization
  (13)-(14) Complete Privatization
  (15)-(16) Competition Allowed in Long Distance Telephony
  (17)-(18) Competition Allowed in Local Telephony
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Table 10: Robustness of Results to Disaggregation of Dependent Variable, Electricity by Type of Reform
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Ratio of Multilateral Lending to GDP 4.241 2.823 4.198 2.579 4.297 3.137 7.087 11.611 -0.829 -5.322
  (H1a > 0) 0.018 0.425 0.016 0.567 0.029 0.304 0.234 0.001 0.087 0.000
Trade Weighted Reform by Other Countries 0.236 0.239 -0.004 0.003 0.544 0.544 1.421 1.229 2.167 2.019
  (H2 > 0) 0.696 0.692 0.994 0.996 0.468 0.468 0.403 0.390 0.032 0.037
Sectoral Performance Shortfall 0.673 0.672 0.789 0.786 0.500 0.501 -0.183 -0.024 0.212 0.214
0.069 0.070 0.018 0.019 0.259 0.258 0.681 0.963 0.005 0.004
Value Added by Industry -0.016 -0.016 -0.011 -0.011 -0.025 -0.025 0.001 -0.003 0.010 0.010
0.257 0.258 0.397 0.400 0.178 0.179 0.983 0.929 0.046 0.059
Urban population share 0.026 0.026 0.019 0.019 0.038 0.038 0.044 0.049 -0.006 -0.005
0.212 0.211 0.273 0.274 0.166 0.166 0.175 0.104 0.205 0.214
Ratio of Foreign Direct Investment to GDP 0.059 0.059 0.062 0.618 0.056 0.056 0.131 0.139 0.008 0.007
0.055 0.056 0.031 0.031 0.118 0.120 0.031 0.015 0.694 0.737
Political Constraints 0.310 0.309 0.352 0.352 0.254 0.252 0.137 -0.015 0.075 0.070
0.510 0.511 0.443 0.442 0.614 0.617 0.875 0.986 0.592 0.612
Budget Balance (as a ratio of GDP) 0.040 0.040 0.032 0.032 0.052 0.052 0.175 0.170 -0.001 -0.001
0.193 0.195 0.244 0.247 0.163 0.165 0.015 0.016 0.916 0.792
Log of Population 0.210 0.209 0.171 0.171 0.270 0.270 -0.015 -0.003 0.107 0.106
0.047 0.049 0.079 0.081 0.037 0.038 0.942 0.989 0.002 0.002
Log of Real Per Capita Income -0.100 -0.100 0.008 0.009 -0.287 -0.284 0.355 0.250 0.177 0.177
0.732 0.732 0.975 0.975 0.424 0.426 0.539 0.675 0.088 0.086
Predicted Probability of Increasing -1.584 -1.572 -1.832 -1.816 -1.319 -1.304 -2.080 -1.675 0.634 0.756
  Multilateral Exposure, From (1), Table 4 0.330 0.327 0.260 0.260 0.438 0.436 0.534 0.580 0.117 0.057
Constant -13.936 -13.839 -14.133 -14.026 -10.325 -10.299 -12.529 -12.804 -7.460 -7.172
0.017 0.019 0.017 0.022 0.047 0.050 0.056 0.085 0.000 0.000
Time Varying Coefficient Estimates
Constant 1.119 1.108 1.134 1.122 1.103 1.100 1.577 1.545 0.176 0.154
0.006 0.009 0.006 0.010 0.030 0.033 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Ratio of Multilateral Lending to GDP 0.152 0.180 0.054 -0.320 0.424
  (H1a > 0; H1b > 0) 0.664 0.676 0.871 0.619 0.056
N 2536 2536 1268 1268 1268 1268 1902 1902 1268 1268
Pseudo Log-Likelihood 340.10 340.25 239.17 239.24 104.92 104.96 -12.35 -4.78 1083.93 1090.84
* p-values are reported in italics underneath coefficient estimates.
**  Strata specific constants and time paramaters are suppressed
Dependent Variables
  (1)-(2) Measures of deregulation (Objective measures and subjective measures described below)
  (3)-(4) Objective measures of deregulation (Regulator independent of Ministry and Regulator independent of incumbent)
  (5)-(6) Subjective measures of deregulation (Regulator semiautonomous and Regulator autonomous)
  (7)-(8) Measures of privatization (minority privatization, majority privatization and full privatization)
  (9)-(10) Measures of competition (competition in the form of autoproduction or private generation for resale)  
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Table 11: Robustness of Results to Disaggregation of Dependent Variable, Electricity by Individual Reform
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
Ratio of Multilateral Lending to GDP 4.574 2.690 3.890 2.593 4.576 2.679 4.043 4.038 -44.510 -36.200 13.264 21.920 13.178 34.582 -0.540 -3.386 -0.762 -8.119
  (H1a > 0) 0.010 0.493 0.029 0.627 0.010 0.495 0.194 0.247 0.006 0.055 0.037 0.006 0.002 0.022 0.174 0.108 0.601 0.005
Trade Weighted Reform by Other Countries 0.173 0.181 -0.195 -0.191 0.193 0.201 1.194 1.194 -1.310 -1.312 -5.762 -5.727 -5.020 -5.294 2.833 2.832 1.415 1.437
  (H2 > 0) 0.783 0.773 0.735 0.740 0.758 0.748 0.428 0.428 0.509 0.508 0.216 0.212 0.158 0.187 0.009 0.010 0.167 0.166
Sectoral Performance Shortfall 0.872 0.870 0.731 0.729 0.870 0.868 -0.289 -0.289 -0.160 -0.158 1.329 1.312 -4.161 -4.089 0.015 0.015 0.779 0.769
0.025 0.026 0.016 0.018 0.026 0.027 0.623 0.623 0.829 0.831 0.099 0.101 0.054 0.051 0.749 0.755 0.000 0.000
Value Added by Industry -0.021 -0.021 -0.004 -0.004 -0.021 -0.021 -0.035 -0.035 0.120 0.120 -0.248 -0.252 0.057 0.061 0.001 0.000 0.031 0.030
0.135 0.137 0.801 0.801 0.138 0.141 0.350 0.349 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.137 0.151 0.834 0.941 0.005 0.006
Urban population share 0.023 0.023 0.016 0.016 0.023 0.023 0.083 0.083 0.022 0.022 0.169 0.172 0.393 0.391 -0.008 -0.008 -0.005 -0.005
0.280 0.280 0.352 0.353 0.280 0.280 0.105 0.105 0.562 0.562 0.001 0.000 0.061 0.061 0.036 0.032 0.507 0.522
Ratio of Foreign Direct Investment to GDP 0.059 0.059 0.064 0.064 0.059 0.058 0.054 0.054 0.046 0.046 0.277 0.279 0.047 0.040 -0.007 -0.008 0.044 0.042
0.118 0.119 0.011 0.010 0.119 0.121 0.216 0.216 0.709 0.708 0.000 0.000 0.566 0.642 0.701 0.674 0.086 0.106
Political Constraints 0.298 0.298 0.403 0.405 0.297 0.297 0.198 0.198 2.267 2.256 -1.488 -1.573 -1.351 -1.213 -0.024 -0.028 0.260 0.009
0.545 0.545 0.377 0.374 0.313 0.548 0.764 0.764 0.019 0.020 0.362 0.332 0.003 0.038 0.789 0.761 0.413 0.539
Budget Balance (as a ratio of GDP) 0.031 0.031 0.033 0.033 0.031 0.031 0.088 0.088 0.047 0.047 0.017 0.172 0.403 0.401 -0.002 -0.003 0.010 0.217
0.313 0.317 0.194 0.195 0.313 0.317 0.089 0.089 0.533 0.533 0.053 0.065 0.005 0.006 0.552 0.435 0.504 0.000
Log of Population 0.212 0.211 0.137 0.136 0.211 0.211 0.455 0.456 -0.543 -0.545 0.375 0.380 1.596 1.602 0.071 0.072 0.217 0.431
0.044 0.045 0.160 0.161 0.044 0.045 0.139 0.139 0.159 0.157 0.185 0.172 0.147 0.152 0.028 0.026 0.001 0.041
Log of Real Per Capita Income 0.012 0.013 0.003 0.003 0.012 0.013 -1.143 -1.143 -1.324 -1.326 -0.316 -0.360 -4.274 -4.345 0.149 0.155 0.437 0.253
0.971 0.968 0.992 0.992 0.969 0.967 0.091 0.092 0.240 0.239 0.726 0.682 0.085 0.088 0.055 0.046 0.041 0.420
Predicted Probability of Increasing -2.031 -2.001 -1.682 -1.670 -2.025 -2.004 -0.709 -0.710 2.955 2.945 -7.704 -7.812 -4.595 -4.713 0.436 0.480 1.016 1.188
  Multilateral Exposure, From (1), Table 4 0.258 0.259 0.271 0.271 0.260 0.261 0.738 0.738 0.599 0.600 0.211 0.206 0.011 0.002 0.239 0.209 0.152 0.079
Constant -14.634 -14.493 -14.641 -14.533 -14.620 -14.478 -7.213 -7.213 -10.113 -10.261 -15.213 -15.739 -23.821 -25.288 -5.515 -5.440 -12.966 -12.721
0.017 0.021 0.014 0.020 0.018 0.021 0.241 0.241 0.539 0.539 0.161 0.124 0.120 0.123 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
Time Varying Coefficient Estimates
Constant 1.096 1.801 1.267 1.257 1.095 1.079 0.488 0.487 2.018 2.026 0.434 0.589 1.417 1.555 0.169 0.137 0.221 0.176
0.009 0.013 0.001 0.003 0.009 0.013 0.346 0.342 0.000 0.000 0.771 0.681 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.064 0.120
Ratio of Multilateral Lending to GDP 0.195 0.115 0.197 0.001 -0.364 -1.711 -1.677 0.667 1.479
  (H1a > 0; H1b > 0) 0.610 0.800 0.608 0.997 0.639 0.071 0.017 0.113 0.000
N 634 634 634 634 634 634 634 634 634 634 634 634 634 634 634 634 634 634
Pseudo Log-Likelihood 103.64 103.68 137.03 137.05 103.66 103.69 10.37 10.37 12.41 12.41 18.73 18.82 9.95 10.09 756.35 756.63 354.89 357.09
* p-values are reported in italics underneath coefficient estimates.
**  Strata specific constants and time paramaters are suppressed
Dependent Variables:
  (1)-(2) Regulator Independent from Ministry
  (3)-(4) Regulator Independent from Incumbent
  (5)-(6) Regulator Semi-Autonomous
  (7)-(8) Regulator Autonomous
  (9)-(10) Minority Privatization
  (11)-(12) Majority Privatization
  (13)-(14) Complete Privatization
  (15)-(16) Competition Allowed in Autoproduction
  (17)-(18) Competition Allowed in Private Generation  
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Appendix Table 1: Year of Telecommunications Reform 
 
Country Name ind_min ind_inc ind_sa ind_a priv_min priv_maj priv_full comp_ld comp_l 
Afghanistan          
Albania 1998 1998 1998 1998      
Algeria          
American Samoa <=1960 <=1960 <=1960 <=1960   1996   
Andorra          
Angola 1999 1999 1999 1999      
Antigua and Barbuda          
Argentina 1990 1990 1990    1990   
Armenia  1998    1998    
Aruba          
Australia 1992 1992 1997 1997 1997   1991 1991 
Austria 1997 1997 1997 1997 1998   1998 1998 
Azerbaijan         1996 
Bahamas, The 1993 1993 1999 1999      
Bahrain 1996 1981    1981    
Bangladesh         1989 
Barbados <=1960 <=1960 1991 1991   <=1960   
Belarus          
Belgium 1993 1993 1993    1996 1998 1998 
Belize 1988 1988    1996    
Benin          
Bermuda        1996  
Bhutan 1999 1999        
Bolivia 1995 1995 1995 1995   1995   
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1999 1999 1999 1999      
Botswana 1996 1996 1996 1996      
Brazil 1997 1997 1997 1997   1998 1999 1999 
Brunei          
Bulgaria 1998 1998 1998       
Burkina Faso 1999 1999 1999       
Burundi 1997 1997 1997       
Cambodia          
Cameroon 1998 1998 1998 1998      
Canada 1976 1976 1976    1991 1992 1994 
Cape Verde 1992 1992   1995     
Cayman Islands          
Central African Republic     1990     
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Country Name ind_min ind_inc ind_sa ind_a priv_min priv_maj priv_full comp_ld comp_l 
Chad          
Channel Islands          
Chile 1977 1977   1978  1989 1994 1994 
China        1997 1994 
Colombia 1994 1994 1994 1994    1998 1998 
Comoros          
Congo, Dem. Rep.          
Congo, Rep.          
Costa Rica 1963 1963 1996 1996      
Cote d'Ivoire 1995 1995    1997    
Croatia          
Cuba     1995     
Cyprus          
Czech Republic 1994 1994   1994    1995 
Denmark 1991 1991 1997 1997   1991 1996 1996 
Djibouti 1998 1998        
Dominica  1967    1967    
Dominican Republic 1998 1990 1998 1998   1990 1990 1990 
Ecuador 1995 1995 1995 1995      
Egypt, Arab Rep. 1998 1998        
El Salvador 1996 1996 1996 1996  1998  1996 1996 
Equatorial Guinea  1987   1987     
Eritrea 1998 1998        
Estonia 1998 1993 1998 1998 1993 1998    
Ethiopia 1996 1996 1996 1996      
Faeroe Islands       1991 1996 1996 
Fiji          
Finland 1988 1988 1988 1988 1998   1994 1994 
France 1997 1997 1997 1997 1997   1998 1998 
French Polynesia 1997 1997 1997 1997      
Gabon          
Gambia, The          
Georgia     1994   1994 1994 
Germany 1998 1996 1998 1998 1996   1998 1998 
Ghana 1996 1996 1996 1996 1997   1997 1997 
Greece 1993 1993 1993 1993 1996     
Greenland       1991 1996 1996 
Grenada  1998    1998    
Guam        1983  
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Country Name ind_min ind_inc ind_sa ind_a priv_min priv_maj priv_full comp_ld comp_l 
Guatemala 1996 1996 1996 1996   1998 1998 1998 
Guinea  1995    1996    
Guinea-Bissau  1989    1989    
Guyana  1991   1991     
Haiti 1987 1987   1995     
Honduras 1996 1996 1996 1996      
Hong Kong, China 1993 1981 1993 1993   1981 1995 1995 
Hungary 1990 1990     1993   
Iceland 1997 1997 1997 1997    1998 1998 
India 1997 1997 1997 1997    1994 1994 
Indonesia 1993 1993   1995     
Iran, Islamic Rep.          
Iraq          
Ireland 1997 1997 1997 1997   1999 1999 1999 
Isle of Man 1984 1984     1987   
Israel  1990   1990     
Italy 1997 1997 1997 1997  1997  1998 1998 
Jamaica 1995 1989     1989   
Japan     1985 1998  1985 1985 
Jordan 1995 1995 1995 1995      
Kazakhstan  1994   1994     
Kenya 1999 1999 1999 1999    1999 1999 
Kiribati 1996 1983   1983     
Korea, Dem. Rep.          
Korea, Rep.  1993     1993 1996 1999 
Kuwait          
Kyrgyz Republic 1997 1997 1997 1997      
Lao PDR  1998   1998     
Latvia  1992   1993     
Lebanon          
Lesotho          
Liberia          
Libya          
Liechtenstein 1999 1999        
Lithuania  1998    1998    
Luxembourg 1997 1997 1997 1997    1998 1998 
Macao, China          
Macedonia, FYR          
Madagascar 1997 1995   1995     
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Country Name ind_min ind_inc ind_sa ind_a priv_min priv_maj priv_full comp_ld comp_l 
Malawi 1998 1998 1998 1998      
Malaysia 1998 1990   1990   1996 1996 
Maldives  1988   1988     
Mali          
Malta 1997 1997 1997 1997 1998     
Marshall Islands 1987 1990   1990     
Mauritania 1999 1999 1999 1999      
Mauritius 1988 1988 1998 1998      
Mayotte          
Mexico 1996 1990     1990 1997  
Micronesia, Fed. Sts.          
Moldova          
Monaco  1997    1999    
Mongolia 1995 1995   1995     
Morocco 1997 1997 1997       
Mozambique 1992 1992 1992       
Myanmar          
Namibia 1992 1992 1999 1999      
Nepal 1997 1997 1997 1997      
Netherlands 1997 1989 1997 1997 1994 1995  1997 1997 
Netherlands Antilles 1992 1992        
New Caledonia          
New Zealand  1990     1990 1991 1996 
Nicaragua 1995 1995 1995    <=1960   
Niger          
Nigeria 1992 1992 1992 1992 1993 1999    
Northern Mariana Islands          
Norway 1987 1987 1998 1998    1998 1998 
Oman          
Pakistan 1996 1994 1996 1996 1994     
Palau          
Panama 1996 1996 1996 1996  1997    
Papua New Guinea 1997 1997        
Paraguay 1995 1995        
Peru 1993 1993 1993 1993   1994 1999  
Philippines 1979 1979 1979    1990 1995 1995 
Poland 1990 1990   1998    1998 
Portugal 1991 1991 1991 1991 1995 1997    
Puerto Rico 1996 1996    1998 <=1960 1989 1996 
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Country Name ind_min ind_inc ind_sa ind_a priv_min priv_maj priv_full comp_ld comp_l 
Qatar  1998   1998     
Romania  1997   1997     
Russian Federation  1997   1997     
Rwanda  1996   1996     
Samoa          
San Marino  1997    1997    
Sao Tome and Principe  1997    1997    
Saudi Arabia  1998        
Senegal 1997 1997    1997    
Seychelles       <=1960   
Sierra Leone          
Singapore 1992 1992 1992 1992 1993    1999 
Slovak Republic 1993 1993        
Slovenia 1997 1996   1996     
Solomon Islands  1988   1988     
Somalia  1995     1995 1995 1995 
South Africa 1997 1997 1997 1997 1997     
Spain 1987 1987 1997 1997 1987  1997 1998 1998 
Sri Lanka 1991 1991   1997     
St. Kitts and Nevis 1985    1985 1990    
St. Lucia  1965   1965  1998   
St. Vincent and the Grenadines  <=1960     <=1960   
Sudan 1996 1994   1994     
Suriname  1980      1999 1999 
Swaziland          
Sweden 1992 1992 1992 1992 1993   1993 1993 
Switzerland 1992 1992 1992 1992 1998   1998 1998 
Syrian Arab Republic  1985        
Tajikistan  1995   1995     
Tanzania 1994 1993 1994 1994 1995     
Thailand        1990  
Togo 1999 1999        
Tonga          
Trinidad and Tobago 1991 1991   1995     
Tunisia 1995 1995        
Turkey  1994        
Turkmenistan          
Uganda 1997 1997 1997 1997  1998  1998 1998 
Ukraine          
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Country Name ind_min ind_inc ind_sa ind_a priv_min priv_maj priv_full comp_ld comp_l 
United Arab Emirates  1999   1999     
United Kingdom 1984 1984 1984 1984   1984 1982 1991 
United States <=1960 <=1960 <=1960 <=1960   <=1960 1980 1992 
Uruguay 1984 1984        
Uzbekistan 1997 1997        
Vanuatu 1989 1989    1996    
Venezuela, RB 1991 1991 1991  1991 1997    
Vietnam  1997        
Yemen, Rep.          
Yugoslavia, FR (Serbia/Montenegro)  1999   1999     
Zambia 1994 1994 1994 1994      
Zimbabwe          
Key:  ind_min = Regulator independent from ministry 
 ind_inc = Regulator independent from incumbent 
 ind_sa = Regulator semiautonomous from political influence 
 ind_a = Regulator autonomous from political influence 
 priv_min = Minority of formerly state-owned enterprise privatized 
 priv_maj = Majority of formerly state-owned enterprise privatized 
 priv_full = All of formerly state-owned enterprise privatized 
 comp_ld = Competition exists in long distance service 
 comp_l = Competition exists in local service 
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Appendix Table 2: Year of Electricity Generation Reform 
 
Country Name ind_min ind_inc ind_sa ind_a priv_min priv_maj priv_full comp_ap comp_pu 
Afghanistan          
Albania 1995 1995 1995 1995      
Algeria        <=1960  
American Samoa          
Andorra          
Angola        <=1960 <=1960 
Antigua and 
Barbuda        1975  
Argentina 1991 1991 1991   1993  <=1960 <=1960 
Armenia          
Aruba          
Australia 1996 1996 1996 1996 1996   <=1960 <=1960 
Austria        <=1960 <=1960 
Azerbaijan  1996        
Bahamas, The          
Bahrain        <=1960  
Bangladesh        1966 1998 
Barbados <=1960 <=1960 <=1960   1991  1982 1991 
Belarus          
Belgium  <=1960 1999 1999   <=1960 <=1960 <=1960 
Belize  1992    1992   1992 
Benin        1983  
Bermuda       <=1960  <=1960 
Bhutan          
Bolivia 1994 1994 1994 1994  1996  <=1960 <=1960 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina        <=1960  
Botswana        1993  
Brazil 1995 1995 1995 1995    <=1960 <=1960 
Brunei        <=1960  
Bulgaria        1989  
Burkina Faso          
Burundi        <=1960  
Cambodia        1996 1996 
Cameroon        <=1960  
Canada 1961 1961 1961     <=1960 <=1960 
Cape Verde          
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Country Name ind_min ind_inc ind_sa ind_a priv_min priv_maj priv_full comp_ap comp_pu 
Cayman Islands          
Central African 
Republic        <=1960  
Chad          
Chile 1978 1978 1978 1978  1986 1988 <=1960 <=1960 
China        <=1960 1987 
Colombia 1994 1994 1994  1997   <=1960 1992 
Comoros          
Congo, Dem. Rep.        <=1960  
Congo, Rep.        1974  
Costa Rica 1996 1996 1996 1996    <=1960 1993 
Cote d'Ivoire  1997    1997  1977 1997 
Croatia        <=1960  
Cuba        <=1960  
Cyprus        1978  
Czech Republic  1992   1992   <=1960 1995 
Denmark  1999 1999  <=1960   <=1960 <=1960 
Djibouti        <=1960  
Dominica  1997    1997   1997 
Dominican Republic 1999 1999 1999   1999  <=1960 <=1960 
Ecuador 1997 1997 1997 1997    <=1960 <=1960 
Egypt, Arab Rep.        <=1960  
El Salvador 1997 1997 1997     <=1960 1995 
Equatorial Guinea         1998 
Eritrea          
Estonia 1997 1997 1997   1999  1997 1999 
Ethiopia        1966  
Faeroe Islands          
Fiji        <=1960  
Finland 1995 1995 1995     <=1960 1998 
France        <=1960 <=1960 
Gabon  1997     1997 1995 1997 
Gambia, The          
Georgia 1997 1997 1997  1997    1995 
Germany     <=1960   <=1960 <=1960 
Ghana 1997 1997 1997 1997    1977 1997 
Greece        <=1960  
Greenland          
Grenada  1992    1992   1992 
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Country Name ind_min ind_inc ind_sa ind_a priv_min priv_maj priv_full comp_ap comp_pu 
Guam          
Guatemala 1996 1996 1996     <=1960 <=1960 
Guinea        1973  
Guinea-Bissau          
Guyana  1998      1969 1998 
Haiti        1973  
Honduras 1991 1991 1991     <=1960 1994 
Hong Kong, China       <=1960  <=1960 
Hungary 1994 1994 1994     <=1960 <=1960 
Iceland        <=1960  
India 1998 1998 1998     <=1960 <=1960 
Indonesia        <=1960 <=1960 
Iran, Islamic Rep.        <=1960  
Iraq        1978  
Ireland 1999 1999 1999     <=1960 1993 
Israel 1996 1996 1996 1996    <=1960 <=1960 
Italy 1996 1996 1996 1996 1999   <=1960 <=1960 
Jamaica 1997 1997 1997     <=1960 1994 
Japan       <=1960 <=1960 <=1960 
Jordan  1999      <=1960  
Kazakhstan  1996   1996 1997 1999  <=1960 
Kenya 1998 1998 1998     <=1960 1997 
Kiribati          
Korea, Dem. Rep.          
Korea, Rep.        1966 1991 
Kuwait        <=1960  
Kyrgyz Republic 1996 1996 1996       
Lao PDR         1998 
Latvia 1998 1998 1998     <=1960 <=1960 
Lebanon        1975  
Lesotho          
Liberia        1967  
Libya        1963 1979 
Liechtenstein          
Lithuania 1998 1995 1998  1995    1995 
Luxembourg      <=1960  <=1960 <=1960 
Macao, China        1978  
Macedonia, FYR        1963  
Madagascar  1998      1975  
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Country Name ind_min ind_inc ind_sa ind_a priv_min priv_maj priv_full comp_ap comp_pu 
Malawi        1970  
Malaysia     1992   <=1960 <=1960 
Maldives          
Mali        1982  
Malta        <=1960  
Marshall Islands        1994  
Mauritania        1978  
Mauritius        1970  
Mayotte          
Mexico 1995 1995 1995 1995    <=1960 <=1960 
Micronesia, Fed. 
Sts.          
Moldova 1997 1997 1997       
Mongolia          
Morocco        1972 1994 
Mozambique        <=1960  
Myanmar        <=1960  
Namibia        1976  
Nepal 1992 1992 1992     1973 1996 
Netherlands 1998 1998 1998   1999  <=1960 <=1960 
New Caledonia        1968  
New Zealand 1986 1986 1986 1986 1999   <=1960 1998 
Nicaragua 1998 1994 1998      1995 
Niger        1970  
Nigeria        <=1960 1994 
Norway 1991 1991 1991     <=1960 <=1960 
Oman        1967 <=1960 
Pakistan 1997 1997 1997 1997    <=1960 <=1960 
Panama 1997 1997 1997   1998  <=1960 <=1960 
Papua New Guinea        <=1960  
Paraguay        1962  
Peru 1992 1992 1992 1992 1995 1996  <=1960 <=1960 
Philippines 1987 1987 1987 1987    <=1960 <=1960 
Poland 1997 1997 1997     <=1960 1997 
Portugal 1998 1997 1998  1997 1999  <=1960 <=1960 
Puerto Rico        <=1960  
Qatar        <=1960  
Romania        <=1960 1998 
Russian Federation     1992   <=1960 1992 
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Country Name ind_min ind_inc ind_sa ind_a priv_min priv_maj priv_full comp_ap comp_pu 
Rwanda        <=1960  
Samoa          
Sao Tome and 
Principe          
Saudi Arabia        <=1960  
Senegal  1999    1999  1983 1999 
Seychelles          
Sierra Leone        1994  
Singapore 1995 1995 1995 1995    <=1960  
Slovak Republic          
Slovenia        <=1960  
Solomon Islands        1975  
Somalia        1978  
South Africa 1987 1987 1987     <=1960  
Spain 1998 1988 1998  1988  1998 <=1960 <=1960 
Sri Lanka        1977 1997 
St. Kitts and Nevis          
St. Lucia          
St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines          
Sudan        1974  
Suriname  <=1960     <=1960 <=1960 <=1960 
Swaziland        <=1960  
Sweden 1996 1996 1996     <=1960 1966 
Switzerland        <=1960 <=1960 
Syrian Arab 
Republic        <=1960  
Tajikistan          
Tanzania        <=1960  
Thailand  1995      <=1960 1995 
Togo        1987  
Tonga          
Trinidad and 
Tobago 1998 1994 1998  1994   <=1960 1994 
Tunisia        1963 1994 
Turkey        <=1960 1997 
Turkmenistan          
Uganda        1982  
Ukraine 1994 1994 1994     1980 1997 
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Country Name ind_min ind_inc ind_sa ind_a priv_min priv_maj priv_full comp_ap comp_pu 
United Arab 
Emirates 1998 1998 1998     <=1960  
United Kingdom 1990 1990 1990 1990  1991 1996 <=1960 <=1960 
United States <=1960 <=1960 <=1960 <=1960   <=1960 <=1960 <=1960 
Uruguay          
Uzbekistan          
Venezuela, RB 1992 1992 1992     <=1960 <=1960 
Vietnam        1963 1996 
Yemen, Rep.        <=1960 1995 
Yugoslavia, FR 
(Serbia/Montenegro)        <=1960  
Zambia 1997 1997 1997     1967  
Zimbabwe        <=1960 1996 
Key:  ind_min = Regulator independent from ministry 
 ind_inc = Regulator independent from incumbent 
 ind_sa = Regulator semiautonomous from political influence 
 ind_a = Regulator autonomous from political influence 
 priv_min = Minority of formerly state-owned enterprise privatized 
 priv_maj = Majority of formerly state-owned enterprise privatized 
 priv_full = All of formerly state-owned enterprise privatized 
 comp_ap = Private firms may generate electricity for their own consumption 
 comp_pu = Private firms may generate electricity for resale 
 
 
 
 
 
